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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
TAXATION-CAPiTAL GAINs TPATmENT DENIED LIQUmATION-REIN-
CORPORATION TRANSACTiON-Moffatt v. Commissioner, 363 F.2d 262 (9th
Cir. 1966)-The revenue laws make a sharp distinction in the tax treatment
of liquidating distributions as compared with dividends. The transactions in
Moffatt v. Commissioner1 illustrate the occurrence of a liquidation-reincor-
poration transaction in which distributions were erroneously accorded by the
shareholders the favorable status of distributions in liquidation.
Moffatt & Nichol, Inc. was primarily engaged in consulting engineer-
ing, and also participated in various joint ventures. The firm prospered
greatly in the decade following its inception in 1947, but only one dividend
was paid (30,000 dollars in 1955) during the company's existence. Through-
out this period the stock was owned by taxpayers Moffatt (45 percent),
Nichol (45 percent), and Murray (10 percent). While these shareholders
were the firm's most important employees, there were more than sixty other
employees of whom approximately one-third were of professional standing.
An outside accountant was engaged by the firm to analyze the tax prob-
lems of both the firm and its shareholders. The accountant's proposal was to
liquidate the firm or to transfer assets to a new corporation with a subse-
quent liquidation of Moffatt & Nichol. By following either proposal, the
shareholders could obtain capital gain treatment of accumulated earnings,
provide capital gains against which the substantial non-business bad debt
losses of both Moffatt and Nichol could be offset,2 and provide a new cor-
porate entity which would not risk joint ventures so as to be a more attrac-
tive investment for Bobisch, an employee of Moffatt & Nichol, Inc.
A new entity, Moffatt & Nichol, Engineers, was incorporated in July
of 1957. While the stock was authorized to be issued to Moffatt (40 percent),
Nichol (40 percent), Murray (10 percent), and Bobisch (10 percent),
Bobisch did not receive any of the stock. From the time Bobisch joined
Moffatt & Nichol, Inc., there had been negotiations for his purchase of
some of the firm's stock from Moffatt and Nichol. Due to the risk involved
in the joint ventures being undertaken by the firm, he refused to pay the
book value which was the price being asked. Bobisch terminated his employ-
ment and both Moffatt and Nichol bought one-half of his right to receive
shares of the new corporation. Thus when the shares were issued, the owners
of the old held identical ownership in the new corporation.
All employees of the old corporation were transferred to the new upon
its formation. The old corporation's work in process was delegated to the new
except certain non-assignable contracts. The new corporation operated on
the same premises and used the equipment of the old corporation. The old
1 363 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1966), affirming, 42 T.C. 558 (1964), Petition for cert. filed,
35 U.S.L. Week 3238 (U.S. Nov. 28, 1966) (No. 804).
2 Between the years of 1954 through 1957, Moffatt and Nichol suffered bad debt
losses of approximately $47,000. Further such losses were anticipated in later years.
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corporation did not execute any new contracts after the formation of Moffatt
& Nichol, Engineers. The Tax Court found as a fact that the only reason the
old corporation remained in existence was to "phase out" its outstanding
Government contracts with its primary activity being to collect accounts
receivable.3
In December of 1958, the directors of Moffatt & Nichol, Inc. resolved
to liquidate the firm. The shareholders received distributions of promissory
notes, cash, automobiles and other assets. Much of the old corporation's
cash was transferred by the stockholders to the new corporation. The only
substantial assets of the old corporation which were not received by the new
were land and building plans which were non-operating assets. The new
corporation ultimately received approximately 65 percent of the assets of
the old corporation.
For the taxable years 1958 and 1959, the taxpayers treated the distribu-
tions from the old corporation as long-term capital gain against which capital
losses were offset. On the theory that the distributions were "boot" incident
to a D reorganization4 and thereby taxable as dividends under section 356,1
the court of appeals affirmed the Tax Court's upholding of the Commis-
sioner's assessment of deficiencies.
Shareholders of closely-held corporations sometimes attempt to with-
draw, at capital gain rates, assets which represent earnings of the business.
This objective is usually pursued by treating the withdrawal as a liquidation
which permits the distribution to be taxed at capital gain rates.6 Since 1924
it has been the law that no gain or loss is recognized by a corporation upon
its liquidation and that its shareholders will recognize capital gain or loss
measured by the value of the assets received in liquidation less the basis for
their shares.7 In contrast, a dividend is a distribution made by a corporation
3 Moffatt v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 558, 566 (1964).
4 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (D).
5 lat. Rev. Code of 1954, § 356.
6 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 331(a). Gain or Loss to Shareholders In Corporate
Liquidations.
(a) General Rule.-
(1) Complete liquidations.--Amounts distributed in complete liquidation of
a corporation shall be treated as in full payment in exchange for the stock.
(2) Partial liquidations.-Amounts distributed in partial liquidation of a
corporation (as defined in section 346) shall be treated as in part or full pay-
ment in exchange for the stock.
The method of accomplishing the distribution usually follows one of two general
techniques: (1) The existing corporation liquidates followed by reincorporation of part
of the assets by the shareholders. See, e.g., Survaunt v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 753
(8th Cir. 1947). (2) The existing corporation sells part of its assets to another corpora-
tion then one of the corporations liquidates. See, e.g., Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d
646 (1st Cir. 1949).
7 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 201-04, 43 Stat. 254. These same principles are
now set forth in §§ 331, 336, and 1001 of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
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out of its earnings and profitss and is subject to taxation at ordinary income
rates." Liquidating distributions and dividends, however, are mutually ex-
clusive categories, so the existence of earnings and profits at the time of a
liquidation would not affect the taxation of the distribution,10 if it otherwise
qualified as a distribution made in liquidation.
While the "liquidation" concept focuses upon the final termination of the
corporate enterprise,"' the "reorganization"' 2 concept requires the business
enterprise to continue in corporate form and the shareholders of the prior
corporation to continue to have substantially the same interest in the new
corporation. A reorganization may be defined generally as:
[A] transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to another
corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor or its
stockholders or both are in control of the corporation to which the
assets are transferred. 13
Since the D reorganization is concerned with neither termination nor con-
traction of the corporate business, retention by shareholders of assets which
exceed the value of the surrendered stock is properly classified as "boot"
and treated as a dividend to the extent that the assets are not in excess of
the shareholders' ratable portion of undistributed profits.' 4 The "reincorpora-
tion" problem arises when taxpayers seek to combine the capital gain benefits
of a liquidation with the reorganization advantages of continued operation
of the business in another corporate shell.15 To permit taxpayers to accom-
plish this objective would be to permit them to treat a distribution as a
capital gain when in fact it is in the nature of a dividend.
In Moffatt, the court construed the transactions as being an attempt to
improperly treat a dividend as a liquidating distribution. This conclusion was
based upon the accountant's memorandum, Moffatt and Nichol's desire to
have capital gains against which bad debt losses could be offset and the
substantial earned surplus which had not been distributed as dividends.
To prevent what was considered to be a tax avoidance device, the ap-
pellate court affirmed the Tax Court's finding of a D reorganization. Super-
imposed on the express statutory requirements for a D reorganization is the
8 See Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 757. Compare Int. Rev. Code
of 1939, § 115(a), 53 Stat. 46, as amended, ch. 619 § 186, 56 Stat. 895-96 (1942).
9 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 301.
10 Hellmich v. Hellman, 276 U.S. 233, 236-37 (1928). This rule is now codified by
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 331(b).
11 See Treas. Reg. § 1.332-2(c) (1955), Kennemer v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 177,
178 (6th Cir. 1938).
12 See Treas. Reg. 1368-1(b) (1955).
'3 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(g) (1) (C), 53 Stat. 40.
14 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 356(a). For general discussion of "boot" see 3 Mertens,
Law of Federal Income Taxation § 20.147 (rev. ed. 1965).
IG See Bittker & Eustice, Federal Income Taxation Of Corporations And Share-
holders 572 (2d Ed. 1966).
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factor of business purpose.16 In reincorporation cases, the business purpose
is found if the operations of the old corporation are carried on in whole or
in part by the new corporation.'1 A business purpose was found in Moffatt
because the new corporation continued the operations of the old with the net
effect being "merely to change the name of the [old] corporation." 18
The statutory requirements for a D reorganization are set forth in two
sections of the Code which Congress has explicitly linked together.19 There
16 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935). This rule is now provided
for in the Regulations. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1955) states that the reorganization
provisions are concerned with "readjustment of corporate structures . . . required by
business exigendes." See also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.368-1(c), 1.368-2(g).
17 Lewis v. Commissioner, supra note 6, at 650. See Survaunt v. Commissioner, supra
note 6, at 758.
18 363 F.2d at 266.
19 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, Sec. 368. Definitions Relating to Corporate Reorganiza-
tions.
(a) Reorganization.-
(1) In general.-For purposes of parts I and IT and this part, the term
"reorganization" means
(D) a transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to an-
other corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor, or one
or more of its shareholders (including persons who were shareholders im-
mediately before the transfer), or any combination thereof, is in control of
the corporation to which the assets are transferred; but only if, in pur-
suance of the plan, stock or securities of the corporation to which the
assets are transferred are distributed in a transaction which qualifies under
section 354, 355, or 356;
Sec. 354. Exchanges Of Stock and Securities in Certain Reorganizations.
(a) General .Rle.-
(1) In General.--No gain or loss shall be recognized if stock or securities
in a corporation a party to a reorganization are, in pursuance of the plan of
reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or securities in such corporation or
in another corporation a party to the reorganization.
(2) Limitation Paragraph (1) shall not apply if-
(A) the principal amount of any such securities received exceeds the
principal amount of any such securities surrendered, or
(B) any such securities are received and no such securities are sur-
rendered.
(b) Exception.-
(1) In General.-Subsection (a) shall not apply to an exchange in pur-
suance of a plan of reorganization within the meaning of section 368(a) (1) (D),
unless--
(A) the corporation to which the assets are transferred acquires sub-
tantially all of the assets of the transferor of such assets; and
(B) the stock, securities, and other properties received by such trans-
feror, as well as the other properties of such transferor, are distributed in
pursuance of the plan of reorganization.
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are essentially three requirements which must be satisfied in order to qualify
as a D reorganization under those sections: 20
(1) All of the remaining property of the transferor as well as all of the
stock, securities, and other property acquired by it pursuant to the exchange
must be distributed to its shareholders under a plan of reorganization.
(2) The old corporation, or one or more of its shareholders, is in control
of the new corporation.
(3) There must be a transfer by a corporation of substantially all of its
assets to another corporation.
It is well settled that it is proper to consider the situation as it existed
at the beginning and end of a series of steps to determine whether the
liquidation of a corporation was merely a step in a plan of reorganization. 21
In Moffatt, the court held that there was a plan of reorganization largely
because of the memorandum of the outside accountant, whose plan the court
found was adopted by the old corporation.22
While there was no formal exchange of stock for stock, courts have re-
cast transactions in a manner which reflects the substance of the transac-
tion;23 thus the court had no difficulty in finding an exchange of stock for
stock. The final step in satisfying the second requirement is finding the
control referred to by section 368(a) (1) (D). Because the shareholders of
the old corporation were authorized to receive 90 percent of the new cor-
poration's stock, they clearly had "control" as defined by the statute.2 4
The requirement that the transferee receive substantially all of the
transferor's assets posed a more significant hurdle to finding a D reorganiza-
tion. The history of the D reorganization section is useful for appreciating
the significance of the "substantially all" requirement. 25 The original pur-
pose of the reorganization section of the Code was to protect taxpayers
against the taxation of corporate transactions where no economic gain was
actually realized. Under the 1939 Code, the D reorganization did not require
that the transferee receive substantially all of the assets of the transferor. 28
The 1954 amendment of that section added the "substantially all' require-
20 Cf., dissenting opinion in Moffatt. 363 F.2d at 268-69, n.1.
21 See, e.g., James Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295 (1964); David T. Grubbs, 39 T.C. 42
(1962); Joseph C. Gallagher, 39 T.C. 144 (1962).
22 The dissent did not find a plan of reorganization. See 363 F.2d at 268-69, n.1,
for statement of circumstances which indicate no plan of reorganization.
23 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Morgan, 288 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1961) (No stock was
issued by the transferor corporation in exchange for the transferee's assets.) ; Reef Corp.
ff 65-072 P-H Tax Ct. Mer. 65-431 (1965); aff'd., 368 F.2d 125 (1966), petition for
cert. filed, 35 U.S.L. Week 3238 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1967) (No. 1005). Ralph C. Wilson. 46.32
P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
24 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 368(c).
25 See Paul, Studies in Federal Taxation, Third Series (1940).
28 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(g) (1) (D), 53 Stat. 40.
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ment for the purpose of withdrawing beneficial reorganization treatment
from transactions in which economic gain was realized 2 7
The imposition of that condition appears to permit more possibilities of
tax avoidance than previously existed in this area.28 The ordnary reincorpora-
tion case is not likely to involve such a transfer of substantially all of the
transferor's assets to the transferee because one of the objectives of such a
device is to divert to shareholders a portion of the transferor's assets. Fail-
ing to satisfy the "substantially all" requirement, the Commissioner must
seek some approach other than a D reorganization to combat the tax avoid-
ance device.
Congress did not intend, however, to permit tax avoidance through the
reincorporation technique. Legislative history indicates that the first effort
to deal expressly with the reincorporation problem was enacted by the House
in 1954.29 The Senate-House Conference Committee based their decision to
.reject the proposal on the belief that the possibility of tax avoidance can be
prevented by "judicial decision or by regulation within the framework of
other provisions of the bill."80 The courts are unclear as to what weight
should be accorded to this statement. While the report cannot be used to
make law, it is clear that the deletion of the provision attacking reincorpora-
tions was not an expression of policy condoning such tax avoidance tech-
niques.31
In the context of this congressional attitude, the court in Moffatt took
the position that the transferee's receipt of 65 percent of the transferor's
assets satisfied the "substantially all" requirement. This conclusion was
reached by adopting the view of Rev. Rul. 57-51832 which proposes that no
specific percentage should be controlling in determining what constitutes
"substantially all."3 3
While the phrase "substantially all of the assets" or the similar phrase
"substantially all of the properties"3 4 has been in the revenue law since
27 See, e.g., Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965), revers-
ing in part, 42 T.C. 510 (1964).
28 Ibid.
29 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). The section pro-
vided that if the transaction has tax avoidance as a principal purpose, the transfer of
more than 50 percent of the assets of the old corporation to a new corporation would
result in the taxability of -the non-reincorporated assets to the shareholders as dividends.
30 H. Conference Rep. No. 2543, 83d Cong. 2d Sess., p. 41 (3 U.S.C. Cong. & Adm.
News (1954) 5280, 5301).
31 See Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra note 27, at 41.
32 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 253.
S3 Both the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have recently indicated their agreement with
a qualitative instead of a quantitative approach to satisfying the "substantially all" re-
quirement. See Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125, 131 (5th Cir. 1966), for case
history see supra note 23; Babcock v. Phillips, 372 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1967).
34 The definition of a C reorganization has long required the transferee to acquire
substantially all of the properties of the transferor. The requirement in the D definition
was probably intended to have the same meaning as the C definition even though the
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1921 , Congress has never codified the term nor have the Treasury Regula-
tions set forth a definition. The case law suggests that the transferee must
acquire at least 80 percent of the transferor's assets in order to satisfy the
"substantially all" requirement. 36 The majority's conclusion that receipt of
65 percent constituted "substantially all" is questionable. The rationale of
the court is suggested where the opinion distinguishes prior cases on the
ground that they "involved a situation where the taxpayer had to show a
'transfer of substantially all' assets to avoid a tax."'37 This indicates that the
court recognized the two distinct functions which D reorganizations serve.
One function is to permit the occurrence of the kind of transaction described
in the statute which could not otherwise take place without imposition of a
tax even though no economic gain is realized. The other purpose is to serve
as a tool to prevent tax avoidance by use of the liquidation-reincorporation
technique. The "substantially all" requirement is meaningful under the first
function; under the second it is a handicap.38 The majority in Moffatt under-
took to uphold the congressional intent that tax avoidance should not be
accomplished by the use of the liquidation-reincorporation device, but the
dissent pointed out the difficulty of harmonizing the majority decision with
the literal requirements for a D reorganization. The dissenting opinion prop-
erly criticized not only the majority's unauthoritative proposition that no
specific percentage is controlling in determining "substantially all" but also
their considering "good will" without valuing it.39 Other strained arguments
advanced by the Commissioner were that "substantially all" means 50 per-
latter uses the term "properties" while the D definition uses "assets.' See Lane, "The
Reincorporation Game: Have the Ground Rules Realy Changed?", 77 Harv. L. Rev.
1218, 1249, n.120 (1964). Thus the interpretation of the C definition will be authority
for proper application of the D definition.
S5 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c) (2), 42 Stat. 230.
36 See, e.g., Pillar Rock Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1937);
The Daily Telegram Co., 34 B.TA. 101 (1936); Edward H. Russell, 40 T.C. 810 (1963),
aff'd. per curiam, 345 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1965).
.37 363 F.2d 267 n.1.
Neither Pillar Rock Packing Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 90
F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1937), nor C. T. Inv. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 88 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1937), compel a different result. C. T. Inv. Co.,
supra, is a weak holding at best, for it was an alternative holding and the
court noted that the point was not raised or considered before the Tax Courts.
Both cases involved a situation where the taxpayer had to show a "transfer of
substantially all" assets in order to avoid tax. Thus, a different standard of
construction applies than here, where "capital gain provisions are an exception
to the ordinary treatment accorded most income [and must -therefore] be strictly
construed." Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revnue, 345 F.2d 35,
44 (4th Cir. 1965).
38 See text supra at notes 30-31.
39 See D. K. MacDonald, 3 T.C. 720 (1944); Northwestern Steel & Iron Corp., 6
B.TA. 119 (1927).
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cent or more4 ° and that "substantially all" refers to the firm's operative
assets.
4
'
The foregoing indicates that the express requirements of the D reorgani-
zation may be difficult to satisfy but the majority's treatment of the distribu-
tions as being in part "boot" taxable as dividends, accords with the true
nature of assets retained by the taxpayers. The firm's operations were in no
way affected by the transactions in question; only if the operations of the
firm terminates or contracts, or the shareholders interest terminates should
the exceptional capital gains treatment for a distribution be given.42 Thus
the distribution received by the taxpayers was in the nature of a dividend
and, as the majority held, taxable as such.
Perhaps in recognition of the spurious reasoning required in order to
remove the barrier of the "substantially all" requirement when dealing with
reincorporation cases,43 the Commissioner has announced that for purposes of
D reorganizations "substantially all" means at least 90 percent of the net
assets and at least 70 percent of the gross assets of the old corporation. 44
If this position had been in effect when Moffatt was decided, the court could
not have found a D reorganization because the new corporation received only
65 percent of the old corporation's assets. An argument can be made that the
Rev. Proc. does not affect the Moffatt kind of transaction. Because Rev. Proc.
66-34 states that the Commissioner will "ordinarily" 45 find the "substan-
tially all" requirement satisfied if the 70-90 percent tests are fulfilled, it can
be argued that those percentages which "ordinarily" apply are not appro-
priate in a liquidation-reincorporation transaction. This approach is not un-
reasonable because it furnishes a guide for those seeking reorganization
40 See note 35 supra.
41 Pillar Rock Packing Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 36, at 950.
42 See text accompanying notes 59-63 infra.
43 The Commissioner was beginning to win on the argument that no specific per-
centage is controlling in determining what constitutes "substantially all." See James
Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295 (1964), citing the Tax Court's decision of Moffatt. An addi-
tional burying of "substantially all" came in Retail Properties, Inc., 23 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1463 (1964). The old corporation had retained a substantial amount of stock, but
this did not prevent the court from finding a D reorganization because the stock was
classified as a non-operating asset. Thus the "substantially all" requirement for finding
a D reorganization was significantly eroded when the Commissioner so requested. See
Pennell, "Developments and Unanswered Questions in Corporate Reorganization," 42
Taxes 889, 901 (1964).
44 Revenue Procedure 66-34, 1966-34 Int. Rev. Bull. 22.
Sec. 3. Operating Rules For Issuing Ruling Letters.-.01 The "substantially all"
requirement of sections 354(b) (1) (A), 368 (a) (1) (C) and 368(a) (2)(B)(i) of
the Code is satisfied if there is a transfer of assets representing at least 90 per-
cent of the fair market value of the net assets and at least 70 percent of the
fair market value of the gross assets held by the corporation immediately prior
to the transfer.
45 Revenue Procedure 66-34, 1966-34 Int. Rev. Bull. 22 § 2.04.
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status from a transaction and preserves for the Commissioner the flexibility
needed to police liquidation-reincorporation transactions.
Rev. Proc. 66-34 may have the effect of diminishing the use of the D
reorganization as an approach for combatting reincorporations, but there is
no reason to suppose that the Service or the courts will look any more
favorably upon tax avoidance devices. Thus it is important to closely con-
sider other approaches available to the Commissioner for preventing tax
avoidance in this area.
Where the transaction in question lacks economic substance or the new
corporate entity is a sham corporation, the court will disregard the formal
transaction and treat the distribution as a dividend.46 Taxpayers are seldom
tripped on this approach because they can usually argue that the transactions
were motivated by business considerations. Almost any colorable business
motive will suffice for preventing the transaction from being labeled a sham.47
Another approach used by the Commissioner is the F reorganization. 48
This section has received almost no administrative or judicial attention until
recently.49 Several cases, however, have indicated that it may properly apply
to situations which do not involve any significant change in the business
of the corporation or the interests of the shareholders. 0 Because of the re-
quirement that there be no more than a "mere change in identity," an F
reorganization was not found where only 72-2/3 percent of a new corpora-
tion's stock was owned by shareholders of the old corporation. 51 An F re-
organization can be found only if the corporate enterprise continues un-
interrupted. 2 In a case where the taxpayer owned promissory notes of the
new corporation instead of stock, the court refused to find an F reorganiza-
tion because the taxpayer did not have a proprietary interest in the new
corporation.53 Although in Moffatt, the court did not expressly hold that the
46 See Hyman H. Berghash, 43 T.C. 743, 749 (1965) and cases cited therein.
47 Id. at 749-50.
48 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 368(a)(1)(F) defines a reorganization as "a mere
change in identity, form, or place of organization, however effected."
49 See Rev. Rul. 57-276, 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 126, Rev. Rul. 58-422, 1958-2 Cum.
Bull. 145-46.
50 E.g., Newmarket Mfg. Co. v. United States, 233 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 983 (1957); Ahles Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 293 U.S. 611 (1934). See also 3 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation
§ 20.94 (Rev. ed. 1965).
51 Joseph C. Gallagher, supra note 21, at 162. See Reef Corp., supra note 23; Estate
of James F. Sutter, 29 T.C. 244, 258 (1957).
52 Pridemark v. Commissioner, supra note 27, at 42.
One author erroneously concluded that the Tax Court decision was correct in finding
an F reorganization because there was no change in identity, form or domicile. Pennell,
"Developments and Unanswered Questions in Corporate Reorganizations," 42 Taxes 889,
900 (1964). The reversal by the court of appeals was correct because of the one year
gap between the old corporation's termination and the new corporation's commence-
ment.
53 Book Production Industries, Inc., ff 65065; P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (1965).
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transaction constituted an F reorganization, it can be speculated that such a
finding could have been made. The facts relevant to such a determination
are that the new corporation was identical to the old corporation in ownership
of shares, business which was conducted, place of carrying on business and
equipment for conducting the operations. The court found that the net effect
of the transaction was "merely to change the name of the corporation." 54
The F reorganization approach, nevertheless, is not an effective means for
combatting the liquidation-reincorporation device on a large scale because
of the foregoing statutory and judicial limitations.
The next possible approach for the Commissioner is the E55 reorgani-
zation. Neither the Code nor the Regulations define "recapitalization," so
presumably a non-technical meaning was intended.58 In general, the term
involves corporate readjustment of existing interests and the rearrangement
of the capital structure.57 The Supreme Court has termed it as being a
"reshuffling of a capital structure within the framework of an existing cor-
poration."5 8 Rev. Rul. 61-156 holds that the "recapitalization" theory is
applicable where one corporation transfers assets to another corporation
followed by liquidation of the transferor.5 9 This position has been rejected
on the ground that the transaction did not take place " within the framework
of an existing corporation."60 This rule is still authoritative, so an E reor-
ganization could not have been found in Moffatt due to the fact that the
transaction occurred within the framework of two corporations. Because of
the requirements for showing an E reorganization, it is useful for attacking
only the most blatant liquidation-reincorporation transactions.
The final approach to be considered is the one which presently has the
most potential as a weapon for preventing tax avoidance. This approach is
to argue that "no liquidation" occurs upon a liquidation-reincorporation
transaction. The statute does not define "liquidation" although there is a
definition of partial liquidation. 61 While it has been held that the liquidation
provision refers only to the steps required by state law to terminate the
corporate existence, 62 the better view is to find a liquidation only if the sub-
stance of the transaction comports with the underlying purpose of Congress.6 3
54 363 F.2d at 266.
65 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, Sec. 368(a) (1) (E) defines a reorganization as a "re-
capitalization."
6 See Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947).
57 3 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 20.93 (Rev. ed. 1965).
58 Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194 (1942).
B9 1961-2 Cum. Bull. 64.
The "recapitalization" approach would not be applicable where liquidation of a
corporation is followed by a reincorporation of the assets. See Mayer, "Ramifications of
The Treasury's Liquidation-Reincorporation Doctrine," 25 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 637, 647 (1964).
60 Joseph C. Gallagher, supra note 21, at 162. (Emphasis in original.)
61 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 346.
62 Hyman H. Berghash, supra note 44, at 758-59.
63 Pridemark v. Commissioner, supra note 27, at 41.
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A distribution in complete liquidation has been analogized to a sale of stock
in that the shareholder "surrenders his interest in the corporation and re-
ceives money in place thereof."164 Thus the corporation must have ceased to
be a going corporate concern, or if the enterprise is continued in corporate
form, the shareholder must have terminated his interest in the concern.
Similarly, for a partial liquidation, the distribution must be pursuant to
a plan of complete liquidation, or there must be a contraction of the cor-
porate concern.65 It can be argued that the liquidation provisions are in-
applicable where the business is placed into another corporation substantially
similar to the old corporation, because under these circumstances the trans-
action does not resemble a sale. This flexible approach has found judicial
acceptance in the Pridemark case, 66 and is generally supported by two regu-
lations.67
The future success of the "no liquidation" approach is probable because
of three circumstances. First, when this approach is invoked by the Com-
missioner, the courts will be called upon to make substantially the same
analysis as they previously have been making in cases where the Commis-
sioner argued that the transaction was a liquidation-reincorporation device.
That preliminary analysis is to determine whether the transaction was moti-
vated by business instead of tax avoidance considerations.68 Second, as the
decision in Moffatt illustrates, courts are inclined to bend statutory language
in order to reach results which are in harmony with the congressional intent
to prevent tax avoidance by use of the liquidation-reincorporation technique.
Third, if the Rev. Proc. 66-34 definition of "substantially all" will diminish
the usefulness of the D reorganization provision for policing liquidation-
reincorporation transactions, then courts will probably fortify this weakness
by being inclined to permit expanded application of the "no liquidation"
approach.
The attractiveness of the liquidation-reincorporation device to share-
holders as a method for saving taxes will continue to prompt these trans-
actions. Those which are more clearly tax avoidance motivated may be pre-
vented by treating the transactions as a sham, an E reorganization or an F
reorganization. The D reorganization approach was once the most useful
means for preventing tax avoidance through a liquidation-reincorporation
device, but the 1954 Code amendments as well as the Rev. Proc. 66-34 de-
finition of "substantially all" have had the effect of diminishing its usefulness.
The "no liquidation" approach presently offers the greatest potential as a
weapon to combat tax avoidance through liquidation-reincorporation trans-
actions.
64 See H. Conference Rep. No. 2543, 83d Cong. 2d Sess., p. 41 (3 U.S.C. Cong. and
Adm. News (1954) 5280, 5301).
65 See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1955).
06 Pridemark v. Commissioner, supra note 27.
67 See Tress. Reg. §§ 1,331-1(c) & 1.301(1) (1955).
68 See, e.g., Hyman H. Berghash, supra note 46, at 749.
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PROPERTY-LICENsEE ALLOWED TO SUE FOP INTERlFERENCE WITH
LiCENSR-Carson v. Hercules Powder Co., 402 S.W.2d 640 (Ark. 1966)-
Plaintiff, Kelsey Carson, a commercial fisherman, had fished in the Bayou
Meto, a non-navigable stream, since 1927. Plaintiff alleged that he had, ex-
cept for one written agreement, oral permission from the riparian owners
abutting the stream to fish in the river. He also had an oral agreement with
one owner, Watson, allowing him to live on Watson's land for life, and he
had so lived since 1951.
Plaintiff claimed that the defendant, Hercules Powder Company, had
polluted the stream, killing fish and causing an obnoxious rotten egg odor,
making the fish unedible and unsalable. Consequently, plaintiff was unable
to fish in the stream from 1961 through 1965. Plaintiff introduced evidence
at the trial that the Arkansas Pollution Control Commission had investigated
the fish kills in 1959, 1963, and 1964, and that a hearing held in April, 1963,
had resulted in a cease and desist order against Hercules. The Commission
found that the Hercules Powder Company had discharged large quantities
of industrial waste, highly toxic to fish and other life, into the stream, thereby,
polluting the stream and creating a public nuisance under Arkansas law.I '
However, the evidence showed that the Commission had been unable to de-
termine the cause of fish kills occurring late in 1963 and in 1964, that pos-
sibly they were caused by water runoff from agricultural lands containing
chemicals, that the obnoxious odor was caused by decomposition of organic
material, and hence Hercules was not responsible for the 1963-64 kills.
Further testimony established that Hercules had obeyed the April, 1963,
Commission cease and desist order, and that pollution caused by Hercules
had ceased. Thereupon, at the conclusion of plaintiff's case, the court found
the evidence insufficient to grant an injunction and declined to award any
damages.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas remanded the proceeding.2
Bland, J., speaking for the court, stated that the Arkansas Pollution Com-
mission had found the defendant guilty of polluting the stream, and, even
though the defendant has since corrected the condition, he is not relieved of
liability to the plaintiff for loss of profits and damages to his business. The
court then cited with approval the following section from Sedgwick on
Damages: 3
Any one having an interest in land is liable to suffer injury in [with]
respect to his [this] right; and accordingly if his right, however
limited it be, is injured, he may recover for [sic] compensation
equal to his individual loss. The general rule may be said to be that
the extent of the injury to the plaintiff's proprietary right, whatever
it may be, furnishes the measure of damages. The owner of a free-
hold may recover for an injury which permanently depreciates his
I Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-1902-09 (Supp. 1969).
2 Carson v. Hercules Powder Co., 402 S.W.2d 640 (Ark. 1966).
3 1 Sedgwick, Damages § 69 (9th ed. 1939).
[Vol. 28
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
property, while a tenant, or one having only a possessory right may
recover for an injury to the use and enjoyment of that right.
The decision in the Carson case4 is unique in that the court allowed a
non-riparian owner, one who at best owned no more than an easement to
fish in the stream, to recover damages for lost business income caused by an
upper riparian owner's pollution of the streamY The court did not hesitate
to award damages to the plaintiff, without any inquiry into the basis of his
right to maintain the action. From a finding that the plaintiff had oral
permission from the riparian owners to fish in the stream, the court reached,
without discussion, the result that, "Any one having an interest in land is
liable to suffer injury in respect to his right."6
The nature of the plaintiff's fishing right could be described as either a
license or an easement. Classification as one or the other, while not con-
clusive, might affect the plaintiff's fight to recover. That a license has not
been considered an interest in land7 while an easement has been so con-
sidered8 immediately suggests a difference between the two that could be
decisive. Without prior determination of the nature of plaintiff's right to
maintain the action, the conclusion that "Any one having an interest in land
is liable to suffer injury in respect to his right,"9 becomes nothing more than
a mere truism and affords no basis to support this decision.
A license is permission to do something, which would otherwise be un-
lawful, on the land of another without possessing any estate or interest
therein.' 0 No formal words are necessary to create a license.'1 Thus, it may
4 402 S.W.2d 640 (Ark. 1966).
5 Ibid.
6 Id. at 642.
7 Radke v. Union Pac. Ry., 138 Colo. 189, 334 P.2d 1077 (1959) ; Boland v. Walters,
346 I1. 184, 178 N.E. 359 (1931); Sweeney v. Bird, 293 Mich. 624, 292 N.W. 506
(1940); St. Michaels Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church v. Clark, 37 Ohio App.
200, 174 N.E. 607 (1930); Settegast v. Foley Bros. Dry Good Co., 114 Tex. 452, 270
S.W. 1014 (1925); Coumas v. Transcontinental Garage Inc., 68 Wyo. 99, 230 P.2d 748
(1951).
8 United States v. Fixico, 115 F.2d 389 (10th Cir. 1940); Eastman v. Piper, 68 Cal.
App. 554, 229 Pac. 1002 (1924); Jenkins v. Brown, 48 Ga. App. 480, 173 S.E. 257 (1934);
Peaslie v. Dietrich, 365 Mich. 338, 112 N.W.2d 562 (1961); Borders v. Yarbrough, 237
N.C. 540, 75 S..2d 541 (1953); Watson v. Wiseheart, 258 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1953).
9 Carson v. Hercules Powder Co., supra note 1, at 642.
10 Wynn v. Garland, 19 Ark. 23 (1857); Polley v. Ford, 190 Ky. 579, 227 S.W.
1007 (1921); Nelson v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 270 Mass. 471, 170 N.E. 416 (1930);
Rodefer v. Pittsburg O.V. & C.R. Co., 72 Ohio St. 272, 74 N.. 183 (1905); Yeager v.
Tuning, 79 Ohio St. 121, 86 N.E. 657 (1908); Toussaint v. Stone, 116 Vt. 425, 77 A.2d
824 (1951); 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements & Licenses § 123 (1966); 2 American Law of
Property § 8.112 (Casner ed. 1952).
11 Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Dorsey, 111 Fla. 22, 149 So. 759 (1932).
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arise from an express grant,12 be implied from the actions of the parties,13
or arise from acquiesence of the landowner to certain acts done on his prop-
erty.14 In McKee v. Oratz,15 the Supreme Court held that a license to hunt
and fish may be implied from custom and the habits of the country. Simi-
larly, in Moundsville Water Co. v. Moundsville Sand Co.,' 6 the court found
that the maintenance of a pipe line over the land of another for a substantial
time, without objection, gives the plaintiff at least the rights of a licensee. A
license may be created either by written instrument 17 or oral agreement
since it is not an interest in realty and therefore not within the Statute of
Frauds.'8 No consideration is necessary to make a valid license.19 A license
is personal and unassignable. 20 Thus, DeHaro v. United States2 1 held that
a license "ceases with the death of either party, and cannot be transferred or
alienated by the licensee because it is a personal matter, and, is limited to
the original parties to it." Also, a license is generally held to be revocable at
the will of the licensor,22 but this general rule is subject to two exceptions.
First, a license coupled with an interest is irrevocable. 23 For example, where
one has purchased a chattel located on the vendor's land, a license, either
express or implied, to enter and remove the chattel sold cannot be revoked.
Second, where a licensee, under the grant of a license, makes expenditures in
12 E.g., Rodefer v. Pittsburg O.V. & C.R. Co., supra note 10; Callaghan v. Cal-
laghan, 25 Ohio App. 96, 157 N.E. 806 (1926); Metcalf v. Hart, 3 Wyo. 513, 27 P.
900 (1891).
13 Cutler v. Smith, 57 Ill. 252 (1870); Kein v. Downing, 157 Neb. 481, 59 N.W.2d
602 (1953).
14 Fischer v. Johnson, 106 Iowa 181, 76 N.W. 658 (1898); Leninger v. Goodman,
277 Pa. 75, 120 Atl. 772 (1923); Eastman v. Piper, supra note 8.
15 260 U.S. 127 (1922).
16 124 W.Va. 118, 19 S.E.2d 217 (1942).
17 Burdine v. Sewell, 92 Fla. 375, 109 So. 648 (1926); Cutler v. Smith, supra note
13; Nelson v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., supra note 10; Sweeney v. Bird, supra note 7.
18 Wynn v. Garland, supra note 10; Eastman v. Piper, supra note 8; Commercial
Nat'l Bank v. Carnahan, 128 Kan. 87, 276 Pac. 57 (1929); St. Michaels Russian Ortho-
dox Greek Catholic Church v. Clark, supra note 7; Yeager v. Tuning, supra notd 10.
19 McClintic-Marshall Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 254 Mich. 305, 236 N.W. 792, 795
(1931); Spalding v. Archibald, 52 Mich. 365, 17 N.W. 940 (1883).
20 Eastman v. Piper, supra note 8; Davidson v. Dingeldine, 295 Ill. 367. 129 N.E.
79, 82 (1920) ; Snowden v. Wilas, 19 Ind. 10 (1862) ; Sweeney v. Bird, supra note 7; St.
Michaels Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church v. Clark, supra note 7; Towery v.
Garber, 196 Okla. 78, 162 P.2d 878 (1945) ; Nunnelly v. Southern Iron Co., 94 Tenn. 397,
29 S.W. 361 (1894).
21 7 U.S. (5 Wall.) 599, 627 (1866).
22 E.g., Wheeler v. West, 71 Cal. 126, 11 Pac. 871 (1886); Elswick v. Ramey, 157
Ky. 639, 163 S.W. 751 (1914); Spencer v. Rabidau, 340 Mass. 91, 162 N.E.2d 767
(1959); Stalder v. Miles, 108 Neb. 386, 387 N.W. 854 (1922).
23 McLeod v. Dial, 63 Ark. 10, 37 S.W. 306 (1896); Holt v. City of Montgomery,
212 Ala. 235, 102 So. 49 (1924); Lambert v. Robinson, 162 Mass. 34, 37 N.E. 753
(1894); Sterling v. Warden, 51 N.H. 217 (1871); Metcalf v. Hart, supra note 12.
[Vol. 28
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
reliance upon the license, the licensor will be estopped from revoking so
long as equitable principles require.2
A license is distinguished from an easement or profit a prendre2 5 in that
the latter two imply an interest in land and therefore come within the pur-
view of the Statute of Frauds.2 6 A license is distinguished from a lease in
that a lease transfers exclusive possession to the lessee2 7 and also may be
required to be written.28
Most courts and writers agree that the holder of an easement, by virtue
of having a property right, is entitled to protection of his rights and privileges
against interference by strangers, either in law for damages or in equity for
an injunction to prevent further interference. 29 Had the grants in the Carson
24 Keystone Copper Mining Co. v. Miller, 63 Ariz. 544, 164 P.2d 603 (1945) ; Munch
v. Stetler, 109 Minn. 403, 124 N.W. 14 (1910); Coumas v. Transcontinental Garage
Inc., supra note 7; First Church of Christ Scientist v. Revell, 68 SM). 377, 2 N.W.2d 674
(1942) (dictum); Harris v. Brown, 202 Pa. 16, 51 Aft. 586 (1902).
25 See Habner, "An Analysis of Profits a Prendre," 25 Ore L. Rev. 217 (1946);
25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements & Licenses § 4 (1966); 3 Tiffany, Real Property § 839 (3d
ed. 1939). Historically, a distinction has been made between easements and profits a
prendre, but today the difference is of little significance, the two being treated together
by legal writers. Technically, a profit a prendre is defined as a right exercised by one
person in the soil of another, or a right to take part of the soil; whereas an easement
is a liberty, privilege or advantage in land without profit, existing distinct from owner-
ship. Thus, while the right to maintain a sewer or right of way over the land of an-
other theoretically may, if properly executed, constitute an easement, the right to enter
and cut timber on the land of another, or to hunt and fish would historically be a profit
a prendre. Aside from the nature of the act to be performed, there is no distinction be-
tween the two. The two are very similar in that both involve use and enjoyment of the
land, are non-possessory, involve rights and privileges relative to the property, involve
rights against society in general, and, being interests in land, must be created by a prop-
erly executed writing. There being no reason to distinguish between the two, using the
two terms can only lead to confusion; therefore, the better known and understood of
the two terms, easement, should be used.
26 Fulcher v. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co., 164 Ark. 261, 261 S.W. 645, 648 (1924)
(dictum); Empire Investment Co. v. Mort, 169 Cal. 732, 147 Pac. 960 (1915); Wilken
v. Irvine, 33 Ohio St. 138 (1877) ; Clark v. Glidden, 60 Vt. 702, 15 Ati. 358, 360 (1888);
Cottrell v. Nurnberger, 131 W.Va. 391, 47 S.E.2d 454 (1948).
27 Rochester Poster Advertising Co. v. State, 27 Misc. 2d 99, 213 N.Y.S.2d 812
(Ct. Cl. 1961); Ohio Valley Advertising Corp. v. Linzell, 107 Ohio App. 351, 152
N.E.2d 380, aff'd 168 Ohio St. 259, 153 N.E.2d 773 (1958); Strandholm v. Barbey, 145
Ore. 427, 26 P.2d 46 (1933); Note, "Real Property-Leases-Licenses-Easements," 14 Ala.
L. Rev. 210 (1961).
28 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 38-101 (1947):
No action shall be brought . . . to charge any person upon any lease of lands, tene-
ments or hereditaments for a longer term than one [1] year.
See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1335.04 (Page 1962).
29 E.g., Buckley v. Marson, 120 Conn. 511, 181 Aft. 922 (1922) (damages); Dewire
v. Hanley, 79 Conn. 454, 65 Aft. 573 (1907) (injunction); Metts v. O'Connell, 13 Del.
Ch. 420, 126 Aft. 276 (1923) (injunction); Powers v. Ward, 200 Ky. 478, 255 S.W.
105 (1932) (damages).
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case been by properly executed writing the inquiry could end. But in fact,
the permission was oral and therefore was ineffective to pass an interest in
land.
It is possible, however, that since the plaintiff had been fishing in the
stream since 1927, he had acquired an easement by prescription. The general
requirements to acquire an easement by prescription are that the use must be
adverse, open and notorious, uninterrupted, under claim of right, for the
period of the statute of limitations.30 The decisive factor is that the use must
be adverse and not merely permissive. There is much authority that use
under a parol grant, void because of the Statute of Frauds, is adverse and
not permissive,31 the theory being that the use is under claim of right.32 In
Phillips v. Phillips,3 3 the court said, "It is generally held that a permissive
use can never ripen into an easement by prescription, at least during the
period within which permission is granted, but this rule does not apply
where there has been an attempt to grant an easement which is void because
of the Statute of Frauds." Whether the parties intended to grant a license or
an easement, then, becomes very important, and must be determined from
the language used.3 4 Thus, in the Carson case, it is possible, assuming that
the intent of the parties was to create an interest in land and not a mere
license, that the plaintiff had acquired an easement by prescription to fish
in the stream, if the remaining requirements to create an easement by pre-
scription were met.3 5 However, if the parties had intended merely to vest
the plaintiff with a license, the use for all the years would have been per-
missive and would have prevented plaintiff's acquisition of an easement by
prescription.
If the plaintiff were a bare licensee, he would seem to be precluded from
maintaining an action in trespass or nuisance. Historically the action of
trespass was for protection of the interest in exclusive possession.36 Nuisance
was an invasion of interests in land, any interest that could be classified as
a property right being capable of supporting the action.37 Additionally, pro-
30 See 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements & Licenses § 39-63 (1966); 2 American Law of
Property § 8.44 (Casner ed. 1952); 2 Thompson, Real Property, § 335-41 (1961 re-
placement).
31 E.g., Peterson v. Corrubia, 21 111. 2d 525, 173 NX..2d 499 (1961); Phillips v.
Phillips, 215 Md. 28, 135 A.2d 849 (1957); Auxier v. Horn, 213 S.W. 100 (Mo. 1919)
(dictum); Jenson v. Gerrard, 85 Utah 481, 39 P.2d 1070 (1935).
32 Klein v. DeRosa, 137 Conn. 586, 79 A.2d 773 (1951); Phillips v. Phillips, supra
note 31; Huges v. Boyer, 5 Wash. 2d 81, 104 P.2d 760 (1940).
33 215 Md. 28, 135 A.2d 849, 851 (1957).
34 Phillips v. Phillips, supra note 31; Wells v. Parker, 74 N.H. 193, 66 AUt. 121
(1907).
35 References cited note 30 supra.
36 Leach v. Woods, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 461 (1833); Abbott v. Abbott, 51 Me.
575 (1863). A mere licensee, not being entitled to exclusive possession, can bring no
action for trespass. Sabine & E.T.R. Co. v. Johnson, 65 Tex. 389 (1886).
87 McClosky v. Martin, 56 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1951) (tenant); Brink v. Moeschl
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tection of a licensee from interference by strangers with his license is denied
because a license generally is revocable at the will of the licensor; hence, the
value of the thing injured would be speculative and hard to measure.38 Per-
haps this conclusion is not as judicially tenable as might appear at first
glance. For instance, in the present case, the measure of damages to the
plaintiff for lost income from 1963 to 1965 is no more difficult to measure
than if the riparian owners were suing. The valuation problem would be in-
volved only if the plaintiff were seeking recovery for permanent damage to
the stream.
Despite difficulties with the theories of common law actions and prob-
lems in measuring damages, a licensee's standing to sue for interference with
his license has been gaining acceptance. Cases in this area may be divided
into two categories: (1) cases in which a licensee sued for damage to prop-
erty which he had placed on the land of the licensor for use in exercising the
license,39 and (2) cases in which the licensee sued for injury or threatened
injury to maintenance of the license itself.40 An examination of the cases
reveals that courts are more willing to grant relief in the former class than
in the latter. Typical of cases in the first area is Moundsville Water Co. v.
Moundsville Sand Co.,41 in which the holder of a license to maintain a sewer
line over the land of another recovered from a third person who had damaged
the sewer pipes. Similarly, in Miller v. Greenwich Township,42 the court held
that one who was licensed to maintain a sewer over another's land, which
sewer had been destroyed by a stranger, was entitled to damages from the
stranger. The court held that an unrevoked license has value.
A factor common to all cases where injury occurred to property placed
on the licensor's land is that the license was probably irrevocable because the
licensee had made expenditures in reliance upon the license, thereby estop-
ping revocation by the licensor 4 3 or irrevocable because the license was
coupled with an interest 4 4 The view of the authors of the Restatement of
Property46 is that a licensee is entitled to protection against interference by
Edwards Corrugating Co., 143 Ky. 88, 133 S.W. 1147 (1911) (adverse possessor);
Herman v. Roberts, 119 N.Y. 37, 23 N.E. 442 (1890) (holder of an easement).
38 2 American Law of Property § 8.125 (Casner ed. 1952); Restatement, Property
§ 521 (1944). But see, fn re Primary Rd. No. Iowa 141, 114 N.W.2d 290 (Iowa 1962).
39 Moundsville Water Co. v. Moundsville Sand Co., 124 W.Va. 118 (1942); 19
S.E.2d 217; Miller v. Greenwich Township, 62 N.J.L. 771, 42 AUt. 735 (1899); Miller
v. Rambo, 62 N.J.L. 191, 49 AUt. 453 (1901); Keystone Lumber Co. v. Kolman, 94
Wis. 465, 69 N.W. 165 (1896); In re Primary Rd. No. Iowa 141, supra note 38.
40 Elliot v. Town of Mason, 76 N.H. 229, 81 AUt. 701 (1911); Moulton v. Bunting
McWilliams Post No. 658 VFW, 213 Ga. 859, 102 S.E.2d 593 (1958); Sabine & E.T.R.
Co. v. Johnson, supra note 36; Powers v. Clarkson, 17 Kan. 218 (1876); Case v. Weber,
2 Ind. 108 (1850).
41 19 S.E.2d 217, 124 W.Va. 118 (1942).
42 62 NJ.L. 771, 42 AUt. 735 (1899).
43 Cases cited note 24 supra.
44 Cases cited note 23 supra.
41 Restatement of Property § 521 (1944):
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third parties to the extent that he is a possessor against such parties, which
means that he must have a relation to the land so as to give him some phys-
ical control over it. However, irrespective of the licensee's physical control,
if his license is revocable at the will of the licensor, protection against third
persons will be denied. Protection will not be denied, however, to the extent
a license has become irrevocable through expenditures made in reliance upon
representations by the licensor or when the license is coupled with an interest.
Thus the facts of each case necessarily determine its disposition.
Representative of cases in which injury occurred to the use and enjoy-
ment of the license is Elliot v. Town of Mason.46 In Elliot, the court held
that occupation of land by a licensee did not vest him with a legal interest
therein; hence, he could not recover for interference with his use and en-
joyment of the land caused by operation of an alleged nuisance by the de-
fendant. Similarly, where a licensee was permitted to graze cattle on land of
another, he was refused recovery for damage to the grazing land.47 In neither
case had the license become irrevocable.
In the present case, plaintiff was suing for injury to his physical utiliza-
tion of the land, and not for damage to tangible property placed on the land;
hence, his activities seem to have fallen within cases of the second category.
The court found, however, that the plaintiff "... had a substantial invest-
ment in a business that had been in operation since 1927." 48 Therefore, the
license had possibly become irrevocable, placing plaintiff within the Re-
statement49 rule and the group of cases where the licensee recovered50
(1) Except as stated in Subsections (2), (3), and (4), a licensee, as such, is
entitled to no protection against interference by third persons with the use privi-
leged by the license.
(2) A licensee is entitled to protection against interference by third persons
with the use privileged by the license to the extent to which the licensee gives
him possession as against such persons.
(3) To the extent to which a license coupled with an interest is not terminable
at the will of the possessor of the land subject to it, the licensee is entitled to
protection against interference by third persons with the use privileged by the
license.
(4) To the extent to which such a license as described iA § 514 has become
irrevocable through the expenditures of capital or labor in reasonable reliance
upon representations by the licensor (§ 519, Subsection (4)), the licensee is
entitled to protection against interference by third persons with the use privi-
leged by the license.
46 76 N.H. 229, 81 AtI. 701 (1911). In Kavanagh v. Barber, 131 N.Y. 211, 30
N.E. 235 (1892), the court said that allowing a mere licensee to recover for the main-
tenance of a private nuisance will greatly extend the class of actionable nuisances and
that the action would only lie for the owner of the land or one having some legal
interest like a lessee, the enjoyment of which was affected by the nuisance.
47 Sabine & E.T.R. Co. v. Johnson, supra note 36, Powers v. Clarkson, supra note 40.
48 Carson v. Hercules Powder Co., supra note 1 at 642.
49 Restatement of Property § 521 (1944).
50 Cases cited note 39 supra.
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In summary, the protection afforded holders of easements and licenses
against interference by strangers with their rights differs due to the nature
of the interest. However, because the law does not place the label "property
right" or "interest in land" on a licensee's right does not mean it is of no
value to him. Obviously, a license can be of great value, as in the instant
case. In such a case, where the licensee has made expenditures in reliance on
representations by the licensor, the licensor is precluded from revoking under
the equitable doctrine of estoppel.r' The law protects the licensee from dam-
age by the licensor, and sound policy would require similar protection from
damage caused by a stranger.
TORTS-THE STRICT TORT LIABILITY OF BUILDER-VENDOS-State Store
Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, - Miss. -, 189 So. 2d 113 (1966) -Defendant
contractors built a home for plaintiffs. As part of the construction, the
contractors installed an electric water heater made by the co-defendant
manufacturer. The manufacturers' instructions directed installation of a
combination temperature and pressure relief valve on the heater. The con-
tractors' agent failed to so install the valve. Eight months after the con-
tractors had turned over the house to plaintiffs and during a time when the
plaintiffs were away from their home, the water heater exploded, substantially
destroying the house and all personal property in it. Plaintiffs brought a
negligence action against both the contractors and the manufacturer. The
trial court found that two thermostats installed by the manufacturer had
failed to work, thus causing the temperature in the heater to increase to a
point where a plastic tube melted and blocked the entry of cold water into
the heater and that consequently the temperature and pressure rose so high
that an explosion resulted. The trial court dismissed the suit against the
contractors and held the manufacturer liable for negligence. On appeal, the
Mississippi Supreme Court reversed, holding that the manufacturer was not
liable to the plaintiffs, since the contractors' failure to install the combina-
tion temperature and pressure relief valve as directed evidenced that the
heater was not expected to and did not reach the plaintiffs without substan-
tial change in condition. Further, the court, relying on the Restatement test
of strict liability,' found that the contractors' failure to install the combina-
51 Cases cited note 24 supra.
I Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) [hereinafter cited as Restatement
2d] provides:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
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tion valve as directed rendered them strictly liable in tort because (1)
without this valve, the heater was in a defective condition and not reasonably
safe for its intended purpose and (2) the contractors expected the heater
to reach the plaintiffs in that condition.
This decision has brought Mississippi into the forefront of the products
liability field. The court first dispensed with the requirement of privity of
contract, to which Mississippi state courts had tenaciously held during the
fifty years since MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,2 began the erosion of the
privity requirement in products liability actions. By so doing, Mississippi is
now in accord with the rest of the states, and privity of contract is virtually
a dead letter in tort actions involving products liability3
After eradicating the privity requirement, the court joined with the
highest courts of thirteen4 other states in adopting the doctrine of strict
liability in tort. This theory that liability may be imposed without proof
of defendant's negligence has developed from cases involving the liability
of a manufacturer of food and drink and was first articulated in 1927 in the
Mississippi case of Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons.5 There the court
developed the notion of a "warranty" running from manufacturer to con-
sumer, like a covenant running with the land, for injuries sustained by plain-
tiff due to broken glass in a soft-drink bottle. Plaintiff was not put to a proof
of the manufacturer's negligence but rather required only to prove the defec-
tive nature of the product, her rightful title to it, and her consequent
injuries.6 While this finding of liability could have rested on several sound
bases, 7 the court chose the terminology of "warranty," a choice generally
accepted in later cases but one which has caused unnecessary confusion.8
The term "warranty," generally associated with contract actions, has tended
to becloud the idea that plaintiff's action and recovery are in tort, thus
making the absence of a contract irrelevant.9 Furthermore, "warranty" as
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
2 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
3 State Stove Mfg. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 116 (1966); Prosser, Torts, 661-63
(3d ed. 1964)Y.
4 CCH Prod. Liab. Rep. ff 4070 (1966).
5 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927).
O State Stove Mfg. v. Hodges, supra note 3, at 118. Some writers contend that such
a showing requires virtually the same proof as in a negligence action. See Keeton, "Prod-
ucts Liability-Some Observations about Allocation of Risks" 64 Mich L. Rev. 1329,
1340-41 (1966).
7 See notes 17-20 infra, and accompanying text.
8 State Stove Mfg. v. Hodges, supra note 3, at 119, citing Prosser, supra note 3, at
678-79.
9 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701,
377 P.2d 897, 901 (1963); Restatement 2d, § 402A, comment m.
[Vol. 28
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
a basis for strict liability became confused with the warranties of the law
of sales, e.g., the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness.' 0 Such
defenses as the failure of purchaser to rely on seller's skill and judgment, 1
failure of purchaser to give notice of breach of warranty to seller,' 2 and
disclaimer of warranty liability,13 while perfectly valid in sales actions, are
not relevant to an action in tort,14 where a manufacturer's liability is im-
posed by operation of the law, not by contract.: 5 Accordingly, numerous
courts, as in the principal case, have discarded the terminology of "warranty"
and explicitly recognized that a manufacturer's liability is grounded on strict
liability in tort.' 6 The various rationales advanced for this doctrine are: 1)
The manufacturer, in placing his goods on the market, gives the consumer
an implied assurance that they are safe for their general purposes;1 7 2) The
manufacturer is better able to bear and/or distribute risks than the consumer
or injured third party; 18 3) A suit against the manufacturer eliminates a
multiplicity of indemnity actions;' 9 4) Holding a manufacturer strictly
liable will be an incentive towards due care by manufacturers, thus protecting
the lives and safety of the public.20
This doctrine of a manufacturer's strict liability has in this decade been
extended to a myriad of products other than food and drink.21 In addition,
courts have fixed strict liability not only on manufacturers, but also on
makers of component parts, assemblers of parts, retailers, wholesalers, and
lessors.2 2 The principal case extends the doctrine of strict liability in tort,
irrespective of "warranty," to building contractor-vendors for the first time, a
10 Uniform Commercial Code §§ 2-314, 2-315 (1962).
11 Id. § 2-315. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479, 491 (3d
Cir. 1965) holds similarly under the Uniform Sales Act.
12 Id. § 2-607(3) (a). See also Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d
292 (3d Cir. 1961).
13 Id. § 2-316. §§ 2-302 and 2-719(3) indicate that such disclaimers or limitations
on liability must not be unconscionable.
14 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d
168 (1964); Greenman v. Yuba, supra note 9; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Prosser, supra note 3 at 681. Contributory negligence
may, however, be a valid defense to a strict liability action. See Maiorino v. Weco
Products Co., 45 N.J. 570, 214 A.2d 18 (1965).
15 See authorities cited note 9 supra.
16 State Stove v. Hodges, supra note 3 at 118-20, citing Restatement 2d and numerous
cases. See also Prosser, "The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer)" 50
Minn. L. Rev. 791, 804 n.80, for a listing of authorities.
17 Greenman v. Yuba, supra note 9, at 63-64; Prosser, supra note 16, at 799.
18 Schipper v. Levitt, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965) ; Santor v. A. & M. Karagheu-
sian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
10 Prosser, supra note 3, at 674.
20 Id. at 673-74.
21 Wade, "Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers" 19 Sw. LJ. 5, 12 (1965);
Prosser, supra note 3, at 678.
22 Prosser, supra note 16, at 814-16.
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most noteworthy development in view of the aura of caveat emptor that has
traditionally protected builder-vendors.
This notion of caveat emptor, strongly established in the law during the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,23 found expression in the rule that a
builder-vendor would not be liable for injuries due to defective construction
unless express warranties in the deed so provided; no liability was imposed
by operation of the law. 24 The reasons usually advanced for this rule were:
1) The purchaser has ample opportunity to inspect the structure for de-
fects; 25 2) The deed merges all prior agreements. Thus, if there is no ex-
press warranty in the deed concerning liability for defective construction,
there is no liability; 2 6 3) When a builder's control over the structure ceases,
so should his responsibility.27 Otherwise, a builder would be subjected to
indeterminate liability, causing chaos in the real estate business.28
This rule of nonliability of building contractors is, of course, a specific
example of the general rule of nonliability propounded in Winterbottom v.
Wrigkt. Like the Winterbottont rule, the rule for building contractors be-
came riddled with exceptions that finally overbore it. One such exception
was that the builder-vendor would be held liable in a negligence action if
he failed to disclose to the purchaser his knowledge of latent defects in-
volving an unreasonable risk of harm.30 Another was the finding of builder-
vendor's liability for negligence if the defect rendered the structure inherently
or imminently dangerous to life and health.31 A third exception found the
builder's implied invitation to a third party as a basis for duty and conse-
quent negligence liability.32
As was the case with manufacturers' liability, the general rule of non-
liability gave way to these exceptions. Thirty-two years after its inception,
23 Hamilton, "The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor," 40 Yale L.J. 1133 (1931).
24 Ford v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 253 (1926), overruled in Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d
469 (1956); Berger v. Burkoff, 200 Md. 561, 92 A.2d 376 (1952); Kerr v. Parsons, 83
Ohio App. 204, 82 N.E.2d 303 (1948).
25 Otto v. Bolton and Norris [1936] 2 K.B. 46, 52.
26 Coutrakon v. Adams, 39 IU. App. 2d 290, 188 N.E.2d 780 (1963), aff'd, 31 Ill. 2d
189, 201 N.E.2d 100 (1964).
27 Mercer v. Meinel, 290 I1. 395, 125 N.E. 288 (1919); Smith v. Tucker, 151 Tenn.
347, 270 S.W. 66 (1924).
28 Curtin v. Somerset, 140 Pa. 70, 21 Atl. 244 (1891).
29 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
30 Murphy v. Barlow, 206 Minn. 527, 289 N.W. 563 (1939); Kilmer v. White,
254 N.Y. 64, 171 N.E. 908 (1930). This exception to nonliability is analagous to the
exception finding liability for a seller established in Lewis v. Terry, 111 Cal. 39, 43
Pac. 398 (1896) and Schubert v. J. R. Clark Co., 49 Minn. 331, 51 N.W. 1103 (1892).
31 Berg v. Otis Elevator Co., 64 Utah 518, 231 Pac. 832 (1924). A comparable
holding in the area of manufacturers' and sellers' liability had been Blood Balm Co. v.
Cooper, 83 Ga. 457, 10 S.E. 118 (1889) and Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397.
32 Grodstein v. McGivern, 303 Pa. 555, 154 At!. 794 (1931). The counterparts in
the manufacturers' and sellers' area had been Devlin v. Smith 89 N.Y. 470 (1882) and
Heaven v. Pender [1883] 11 Q.B.D. 503.
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the MacPherson rule was extended to builder-vendors, making them liable
in negligence suits for injuries sustained by one foreseeably endangered by
a structural defect.2 3 The courts so holding have made clear the
close analogy between a supplier of chattels and a general contractor
for the construction of a building .... Surely there is no valid dis-
tinction between a general contractor constructing a building and
using subcontractors to install equipment therein, and the manu-
facturer of an automobile buying parts not fabricated by it to
install in the car, and selling the assembled car. There should be
liability in both cases.34
This parallel between builder-vendors and manufacturers of chattels
has also found expression in actions based on a theory of implied warranty
of habitability, much akin to the sales warranties of fitness and merchant-
ability.3r For example, a Colorado case36 has held that a plaintiff, being
unable to conduct an effective inspection of a house, would have a good
cause of action in contract against a builder-vendor based on an implied
warranty that the house would be fit for its intended use. Such a warranty
could be extended to cover liability for personal injury,37 but it would, of
course, be subject to "the trappings of warranty laws."138 Similarly, recovery
in negligence is often hampered by problems of proof, notably in attempts
to invoke res ipsa loquitur.9 Perhaps these are the major reasons for the
development of the doctrine of strict liability in tort in regard to builder-
vendors. It sidesteps many of the above problems by not requiring proof
of negligence and by abrogating the usual sales warranty defenses.40
This idea of a builder-vendor's strict liability was first expressed, al-
23 Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 166 F.2d 908 (3d Cir. 1948); Dow
v. Holly Mfg. Co., 49 Cal. 2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 (1958); Inman v. Binghamton Housing
Authority, 3 N.Y.2d 137, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699, 143 N.E.2d 895 (1957). "The last few
years have seen a flood of decisions extending the rule of the MacPherson case to
building contractors." Prosser and Smith, Cases and Materials on Torts, 859 (3d ed.
1962). See also Krause, "Products Liability and the Independent Contractor," 1964 U.
Ill. L.F. 748, 753 (1964).
34 Dow v. Holly, supra note 33, at 726-27, 321 P.2d at 739-40.
85 Supra note 10. This use of "warranty" is in the context of the law of sales and
is not to be associated with "warranty" as a synonym for strict liability in tort. See
notes 7-10 supra and accompanying text.
36 Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
37 Keeton, supra note 6, at 1345.
38 Sebert, "Products Liability-The Expansion of Fraud, Negligence, and Strict
Tort Liability," 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1350, 1370 (1966). In addition to the availability of the
usual sales warranty defenses, supra notes 11-13, many courts have held that a warranty
is implied only until completion of the house. See Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52
Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958), assumed without so holding, and Miller v. Cannon
Hill Estates, Ltd., [1931J 2 K.B. 113. Accord, Inman v. Binghamton, supra note 33, for
negligence actions.
39 Sebert, supra note 38, at 1363-68.
40 Restatement 2d § 402A, comment m.
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though in a guise of "warranty," by the same court that had, five years
earlier in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,41 expanded the coverage of
"warranty" to products beyond food and drink. The New Jersey Supreme
Court in Schipper v. Levitt,42 held that a mass builder-vendor could be
liable on an implied warranty of habitability to a plaintiff who was not in
privity with the builder and who had sustained injuries due to a defect in
the structure; no proof of negligence was required. Citing the products'
liability cases, the court grounded this finding on: 1) The absence of any
clear distinction between a builder-vendor and a manufacturer or seller of
chattels; 2) The injured party's reliance on the builder-vendor's skill owing
to the former's inability to make an effective inspection; 3) The disparity of
economic resources between a mass builder-vendor and an individual pur-
chaser; and 4) The consequent proposition that risks ought to be borne by
the builder.43 While it seems clear that the primary thrust of this opinion is
towards strict liability in tort, the language of "implied warranty of
habitability" may well cause confusion similar to that in the chattel cases. 44
Already one case4 5 has cited Schipper as authority for implying, in regard
to a house, a warranty of fitness akin to that of the law of sales.46 In
abandoning the rationale of "warranty" for the doctrine of strict liability
in tort, the principal case avoids these problems. For example, it sidesteps
the effect of statutes that prohibit the implication of any warranties in the
conveyance of real property.4 7 It makes clear that the defendant's liability
is in tort, based on his implied representation of the safety of his product
and his superior risk-bearing ability,48 thus making irrelevant the usual
contract defenses. By bringing builder-vendors within the Restatement test
of strict liability,4 9 this case emphasizes the analogy between builders and
manufacturers and has speeded up the development of tort law in regard
to building contractors.50 Just as Greenman5 advanced the notion of strict
liability beyond the "warranty" terminology of Henningsen,5 2 the principal
case moves beyond Schipper5 3 in establishing the strict liability of builder-
vendors, be they mass-producers of houses or contractors doing a modest
business.5 4
41 Supra note 14. This case implied a "warranty," in the strict liability sense, run-
ning from the manufacturer and dealer of a defective automobile to the purchaser's
wife injured as a result of that defect.
42 Supra note 18. Defendant builder-vendor advertised that the water systems in
its homes produced extraordinarily hot water. Instead of using any special protective
device, defendant merely used the usual mixing-type faucet and warned occupants to
always turn on the cold water before the hot. One who purchased a home from de-
fendant leased it to plaintiff, whose small son was scalded by the hot water.
48 "The public interest dictates that if such injury does result from the defective
construction, its cost should be borne by the responsible developer who created the
danger and who is in the better economic position to bear the loss rather than by
the injured party who justifiably relied on the developer's skill and implied representa-
tion." Schipper v. Levitt, supra note 18, at 91, 207 A.2d at 326.
44 See notes 7-16, supra, and accompanying text.
45 Bethlahrmy v. Bechtel, - Idaho -, 415 P.2d 698 (1966). See also Rosenau v.
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Apart from the general arguments concerning the concept of strict tort
liability,5m there are numerous arguments in regard to the imposition of such
liability specifically on builder-vendors. For example, one argument against
such imposition is based upon serious doubts as to the validity of the
analogy of builders and manufacturers, an analogy that lies at the heart
of the extension of strict liability to builder-vendors. 56 It is argued that a
house or a building is a far more complex entity than a chattel and conse-
quently has a greater probability of being defective. It is contended that a
mass-produced chattel is quite different from a house made to the owner's
specifications. Furthermore, the analogy is doubted on the basis that a
manufacturer produces a product, while a building contractor performs a
service, which ought to be beyond the scope of products liability.
Another major argument against the imposition of strict tort liability
is that if causation of injury can be shown, the effect of the statute of
limitations is eradicated. Proponents of this view cite cases where recovery
has been made in negligence suits for injuries sustained eighteen years after
completion of the house.57 These proponents argue that the policies in favor
of repose and against speculative lawsuits are laid asunder by such holdings.
A third argument is that the imposition of strict tort liability on build-
ers ought properly to be a legislative, not a judicial, function. 58 Imposition
City of New Brunswick, 93 N.J. Super 49, 224 A.2d 689 (1966), where the court held
that the statute of limitations applicable to sales warranties was a valid defense to an
action in strict tort liability.
46 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-315 (1962). Arguably, this warranty approach
gives a broader remedy than strict liability in tort, since "warranty" may justify recovery
for loss of bargain, as well as damage to person and property. See 51 Cornell L.Q. 389,
398-99, (1965) and Keeton, supra note 6, at 1344-46, discussing Seedy v. White Motor
Co., - Cal. 2d -, 45 Cal. Rptr 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965). This only further demon-
strates the essential differences between sales warranties and strict liability in tort.
47 See, e.g., Ore. Rev. Stat. § 93.140 (1965).
48 State Stove v. Hodges, supra note 3, at -, 189 So. 2d at 119-20.
49 Restatement 2d § 402A. State Stove v. Hodges, supra note 3, at -, 189 So. 2d at
123-24.
50 "The law as to building contractors has, in general, developed along the same
lines as that of manufacturers and sellers of chattels, but has tended to lag some twenty
or thirty years behind it." Prosser and Smith, supra note 33, at 858.
51 Greenman v. Yuba, supra note 9.
2 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, supra note 14.
53 Schipper v. Levitt, supra note 18.
54 Schipper v. Levitt stressed the mass-production position of defendant, the de-
veloper of the various "Levittowns." The principal case made no reference to the size
of the contractors' business.
rZ See Sebert, supra note 38, at 1370 n.115 for citations to articles supporting and
opposing the concept of strict liability in tort.
50 Krause, supra note 33, at 767-69.
57 Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948).
58 51 Cornell L.Q. 389, 396, 401 (1965); 45 B.U.L. Rev. 289, 294 (1965).
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of strict liability and abrogation of caveat emptor in the sales of realty are,
this argument runs, essentially economic and social policy determinations
most properly vested in the legislature, which has greater fact-finding ability,
greater objectivity, and a more democratic decision-making process than
an appeals court.
The fourth major argument relates to risk allocation, which underlies
much of strict tort liability. 9 A manufacturer can bear the risks of strict
liability by spreading the increased costs involved to his many consumers,
"whereas a like opportunity is not available to the typical independent
contractor." 60 The small building contractor is often not insured,61 thus
making him as poor a risk bearer as the owner of a house. The cost of
liability insurance coverage could put a small builder-vendor in a non-
competitive position; it might be just as wise, from a risk-allocation point
of view, for the purchaser to insure himself.62 Furthermore, the completed
operations exclusion in many liability insurance policies may render such
insurance valueless in tort suits for injuries sustained years after completion
of the structure.63
Many of these arguments can be negatived, while others do not carry
enough weight to overcome the justifications for the imposition of strict
liability on builder-vendors. For example, the analogy between the manu-
facturer of a chattel and the builder-vendor of a structure seems quite clear.
A house may contain more parts, but this is a difference of degree, not
kind.64 Both builders and manufacturers have general control over the
making of their respective products;0 5 both of them have a superior bargain-
ing position vis-h-vis the individual purchaser; 66 and both of them give im-
plied assurances of safety by placing their products on the market.67
The contention that a statute of limitations is rendered of no effect by
imposition of strict liability is equally applicable to negligence actions, which
have permitted recovery.68 It is arguable that even if an injury is sustained
several years after the completion of a house, the cause of action does not
59 Keeton, 'Products Liability-Some Observations about Allocation of Risks,"
64 Mich L. Rev. 1329, 1333 (1966).
60 Krause, supra note 33, at 767.
61 51 Cornell L.Q. 389, at 399-400.
62 Krause, supra note 33, at 768 n.87.
63 Completed operations exclusions are clauses inserted in liability insurance policies
for the purpose of relieving the insurer of liability for accidents occurring after com-
pletion of work by the insured, despite the fact that the injury resulted from acts or
omissions during the work.
64 42 Va. L. Rev. 403, 405 (1956). A more complex product may well have a
greater probability of defect, but this should merely induce a higher standard of care.
65 Dow v. Holly, supra note 33, at 725-26.
66 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
67 Greenman v. Yuba, supra note 9, at 63-64, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700-01, 377 P.2d at
900-01; Schipper v. Levitt, supra note 18, at 91, 207 A.2d at 325.
68 See authorities cited supra note 57.
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accrue until then, especially if the structural defect is not reasonably dis-
coverable.69 Then the statute of limitations would take effect.
Against the argument that the extension of strict liability to builders
ought to be done, if at all, by the legislature may be weighed the fact that
the doctrine of strict liability itself has been developed by courts, often
drawing on the ideas of legal theorists,70 and not by legislatures. Further-
more, there are areas within the strict liability field, such as the criteria of
a "defect," 71 which are somewhat ephemeral, do not admit of any broad,
legislative definition, and thus are better handled by courts on a case-by-case
basis.
The contention that builder-vendors should not be strictly liable since
they may be poor risk-allocators presupposes that the goal of strict liability
and risk-shifting is to spread losses as broadly as possible, both quantitatively
and temporally. This assumption ignores other possible goals of risk-shifting,
namely that those best able to pay ought to bear the burden of loss-the
"deep pockets theory" 72-or that enterprises whose profit-making activities
lead to losses ought to bear these losses in the interest of resource allocation.73
In addition, small manufacturers of chattels, who may also be poor risk-
allocators, have not been absolved of strict liability in tort; there seems no
added justification to insulate builder-vendors from liability. Finally, the
completed operations exclusions in liability insurance policies have been
successfully challenged, 74 thus making such coverage applicable to jjrotect
builder-vendors.
Beyond these issues, the fact is clear that the purchaser of a new home
is not competent to make an inspection for structural defects, and even a
skilled examiner may not be able to detect latent defects. 75 Thus, the
purchaser must rely on the builder-vendor's implied representation of
safety. The builder-vendor is in full control of the construction of the house76
and therefore is in the best position to assume the responsibilty for remedying
structural defects. If he reaps profits from his activities, he ought also bear
the risks involved in those activities.7 7 Consequently, he will use greater
care to protect the lives and property of users of the home.78 He should take
69 White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 18 A.2d 185 (1941); Rapson, "Products
Liability under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts between the Uniform Commercial Code
and Strict Liability in Tort," 19 Rutgers L. Rev. 692, 707 (1965).
70 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), relied
on the writings of Harper and James, while the principal case relied strongly on Prosser.
71 Sebert, supra note 38, at 1372-75.
72 Prosser and Smith, supra note 33, at 632.
73 See Caabresi, "Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts," 70
Yale L.J. 499 (1961) for a discussion of the goals of risk distribution.
74 Lloyds Casualty Insurer v. McCrary, 149 Tex. 172, 229 S.W.2d 605 (1950).
75 Bearman, "Caveat Emptor in the Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults upon the
Rule," 14 Vand. L. Rev. 541, 545 (1961).
76 Dow v. Holly, supra note 33, at 725.
77 Savada v. White Motor Co., 32 III. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
78 51 Cornell L.Q. 389, at 399.
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every precaution to make the house safe for habitation, especially in view of
the large investment normally entailed in the purchase of a house.
Mississippi is as yet the only jurisdiction to impose strict liability in tort
on builder-vendors without qualification. Since the movement to strict
liability has amounted to a "groundswell" in recent years, 79 it will not be
surprising to see courts in other jurisdictions impose strict liability on
builder-vendors.80 Since, however, strict liability is based to a large extent
on a defendant's superior risk-bearing or risk-allocating ability, these courts
may hesitate to impose strict liability on builder-vendors who are poor
risk-bearers or risk-allocators. Relevant areas of inquiry to differentiate be-
tween superior and inferior risk-bearers and risk-allocators would be the size
of the builder-vendor's business, the possible degree of precision in estimating
probable losses and offsetting them by insurance, and the impact of the added
burden upon the builder-vendor. 8' Conclusions drawn from such inquiries may
aid courts in setting guidelines for the imposition of strict liability on par-
ticular classes of builder-vendors, rather than on an all-or-nothing basis. No
equal protection problem would conceivably arise, so long as the differentiation
were a reasonable one.8 2
The holding in the principal case may also indicate a future expansion
of strict liability to include lessors of real property. Generally, a lessor has
been subject to tort liability to his lessee only for a dangerous condition of
which he knew and failed to notify his lessee.8 3 Since the loss-bearing ability
of a lessor of realty may be as broad as that of a vendor, especially with
regard to those operating on a large scale, lessors may well be held strictly
liable in tort.8
TAXATION-BusINEss ExPENSE DEDUCTION ALLOWED FOR SEVEN YEAR
PSYCHOANALYTIC INSTITUTE-Greenberg v. Commissioner, 367 F.2d 663 (1st
Cir. 1966)-Is a psychiatrist allowed to deduct as a business expense the
costs of psychoanalytic training undertaken at a Psychoanalytic Institute?
This was the question presented to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
in Greenberg v. Commisioner.1 The petitioner, Ramon M. Greenberg, was a
79 Wade, "Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers," 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 12 (1965).
80 This seems to be the case despite such holdings as the recent Mitchem v. John-
son, 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 218 N.E.2d 594 (1966), which held that a purchaser's only
theories of tort recovery against a builder-vendor would be negligence and misrepresen-
tation.
81 41 Wash. L. Rev. 166, 172-73 (1966).
82 Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152 (1919).
83 Prosser, Torts, 412-14 (3d ed. 1964).
84 41 Wash. L. Rev. 166, 171-72. See also Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental
Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965), imposing strict liability on a mass lessor of
chattels.
1 367 F.2d 663 (1st Cir. 1966).
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practicing psychiatrist who pursued a six or seven year institute sponsored
training program in psychoanalysis, upon the completion of which he would
be eligible for membership in a Psychoanalytic Institute and be given
recognition as a psychoanalyst. He was already a psychiatrist and free to
use psychoanalytic methods in his practice.
The deduction which was available under Int. Rev. Code of 1954, sec-
tion 162 (a) depended upon the applicable 1954 Treasury Regulations section
1.162-5 (a) (1), Expenses for education, which read
(a) Expenditures made by a taxpayer for his education are de-
ductible if they are for education (including research activities)
undertaken primarily for the purpose of: (1) Maintaining or im-
proving skills required by the taxpayer in his employment or other
trade or business....
Although there was the petitioner's unimpeached testimony that he took the
training to improve his skills as a psychiatrist, the Tax Court refused the
deduction,2 relying heavily upon the Namrow3 and Gilmore4 cases for the
proposition that a psychiatrist's attendance at a Psychoanalytic Institute for
sLx or seven years of training was for the purpose of acquiring a new skill
and not for improving or maintaing a skill. The court of appeals reversed
the Tax Court, holding that it was not enough that psychoanalysis is a spe-
cialty, and that under the primary purpose test of the present regulations,
the unimpeached testimony that the course was taken to improve skills as a
psychiatrist and not to become a psychoanalyst was sufficient to allow the
deductionYi
The importance of the case lies in the court's realization that under the
regulations the acquisition of a specialty is not inconsistent with the im-
provement of skills required for a pre-existing profession, that the expenses
of a taxpayer's educational activity are deductible if he has as his primary
purpose the improvement of his skills regardless of whether he acquires a
specialty or a new skill in the process. Although this is supported strongly
by the language of the regulation, the Tax Court had followed previous
cases6 and refused to allow a deduction based upon a taxpayer's primary
purpose. In the words of concurring Judge Withey of the Tax Court: "To
me, it is unrealistic, not to say naive, to consider that in enacting § 162 (a)
of the 1954 Code, Congress would leave the deductibility or nondeductibility
of such an expense to the mere whim of the taxpayer." 7 In part it seems to be
this feeling on the part of judges which has created the difficulty in this area.
The court of appeals has clarified the area by recognizing that under the
2 45 T.C. 480 (1961).
8 Namrow v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 419 (1959), aff'd, 288 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 914 (1961).
4 Gilmore v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 765 (1962).
5 Greenberg v. Commissioner, supra note 1, at 668.
6 Namrow and Gilmore, supra notes 3 and 4.
7 45 T.C. at 483.
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existing regulations whether or not educational expenses are deductible de-
pends upon the taxpayer's primary purpose in acquiring new knowledge, and
not by the fact that in undertaking the education the taxpayer might be
acquiring a new skill. It is a realization by the court that most occupations
require a number of skills, that a person may improve his present status
while at the same time learning a specialty. This thinking was accepted in
some areas, but until Greenberg was rejected in regards to psychoanalysis.
The decision also brings the law into agreement with cases like Watson v.
Commissioner,8 holding that a physician practicing internal medicine could
deduct the cost of a course in psychoanalysis taken for the purpose of main-
taining and improving his skills in his general practice, and Carlucci v. Com-
missioner,9 which allowed an industrial psychologist to deduct the expenses
of obtaining a doctorate. On the other hand, the decision keeps the primary
purpose test which has both given the courts so much difficulty in application
and also created taxpayers whose primary purpose changes the day after
graduation from school.
From the cases cited above, and those mentioned by various com-
mentators, 10 it may be seen that consistency has not been a primary concern
regarding the allowance of section 162 (a) expenses for education. Proposed
changes in the regulations were announced by the Commissioner on July 7,
1966,"1 and again later in the year on October 1, 1966,) 2 when the July
proposals were withdrawn and new ones propounded. The July 7th proposals
replaced the primary purpose test with a broader conception of educational
expenditures. If personal or capital's in nature they are not deductible even
though they maintain or improve skills or meet employer's requirements. Ex-
penditures which the July 7th proposals immediately disqualified for deduc-
tion included without qualification all degree candidates, and expenses qual-
ifying one for a new position, business, or specialty regardless of whether the
individual intended to engage in the new field or advance himself.
It can be seen that the July 7 proposals would have had drastic conse-
quences upon the deductions of internal revenue agents and accountants
taking law school courses,14 as well as many educational expenses incurred
by teachers.' 5 In short, the proposal would have had debilitating effects on
many taxpayers seeking educational expense deductions. On the other hand,
it did away with the necessity of basing a deduction on the courts' evaluation
of the taxpayer's primary purpose, and at the same time would have achieved
8 31 T.C. 1014 (1959).
9 37 T.C. 695 (1962).
10 See Wolfman, "Professors and the Ordinary and Necessary Business Expense,"
112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1089 (1964).
11 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5, 31 Fed. Reg. 9276 (1966).
12 Proposed Tress. Reg. § 1.162-5, 31 Fed. Reg. 12843 (1966).
13 See Sdtovsky, Welfare and Competition 189-229 (1952).
'4 Welsh v. United States, 329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964).
15 The proposal would have written off all degree candidates regardless of other
factors.
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a greater uniformity of the law in this area. However, the proposal's draconic
consequences apparently caused it to be withdrawn.
The revised proposals announced October 1, 1966, likewise replace
the present primary purpose test with the concept that if educational ex-
penditures are personal or capital in nature they will not be deductible al-
though they do improve or maintain skills or meet the express requirements
of either one's employer or of applicable law.'0 Two categories of non-
deductible expenditures which this proposal sets up are those incurred to
meet minimum educational standards and those made by an individual for
education which will lead toward qualifying him for a new trade or business
position or specialty. The proposal will allow the deductibility of educational
expenses for maintaining or improving skills if not within the above cate-
gories. (It seems that if the new proposals are adopted, the Greenberg result
would be foreclosed, since the expense there would definitely qualify the
taxpayer for a new specialty). Thus various educational expenses which
would not have been allowed under the July 7 proposals (which limited
expenses which could be deducted largely to review or refresher courses)
will be allowed by the October 1 proposals, and deductions will be allowed
under this category for expenses for academic or vocational courses so long
as they are not taken to meet minimum educational requirements or qualify
one for a new trade. Likewise, under the new proposals, educational ex-
penses incurred in meeting express requirements of the employer, or the
requirements of applicable law or regulations which the taxpayer must meet
in order to maintain the established employment relation will be allowed,
but only if such requirements are imposed for a bona fide business purpose
of the individual's employer.
The proposal restricts the deduction to the minimum education neces-
sary to the retention by the individual of his established employment rela-
tionship, status, or rate of compensation. Thus a tenured professor could
deduct expenses incurred in doing research in another country. Such educa-
tion in excess could qualify under section 1.162-5(c) (2) as education taken
to maintain or improve skills required by the taxpayer in his present em-
ployment.
The proposal's major changes would be to no longer allow the deduction
of expenses heretofore allowable to insurance adjusters, accountants, and
tax agents attending law school. Under the proposal's section 1.162-5(b) (3),
these taxpayers would be qualifying for a new trade, business, position,
or specialty, and thus their primary purpose in taking the law courses would
no longer be relevant. Teachers, however, would be in much the same posi-
tion deduction-wise as they are under present regulations. The proposal
specifies in section 1.162-5(b)(2)(ii) that minimum educational require-
ments are to be taken as the minimum level of education (in terms of college
hours or degree) which under the law in effect at the time the individual
was first employed in such position, was normally required of an individual
16 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5, 31 Fed. Reg. 12843 (1966).
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initially being employed in such a position. Then in section 1.162-5(b) (3),
the proposal specifies that changes in duties, such as a change from ele-
mentary to secondary school teacher, teacher of mathematics to teacher of
science, and classroom teacher to guidance counsellor, do not constitute new
positions or specialties. If there are no normal requirements, the teacher will
be taken to have met the requirements when admitted to the faculty. Thus,
teachers remain in much the same position as they occupy presently, although
certain things are perhaps spelled out more explicitly.
In addition to improving the existing law through its greater specifica-
tion of what is deductible and what is not, by doing away with the primary
purpose test, the proposal of October 1 seems to follow more closely the spirit
and purpose of section 162 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code.1 7 With the aid
of the new proposal the courts could truly look beyond the primary purpose
of the taxpayer in the particular case to whether or not the claimed deduc-
tion was an ordinary and necessary expense proximately related to the pro-
duction of the income. In this way the law in this area, which Judge Dawson
of the Tax Court called "a hodgepodge of seemingly irrevocable decisions,"18
could perhaps be clarified. With the ouster of the primary purpose test, with
which the finder of fact is set "to sail on an illimitable ocean of individual
beliefs and experiences,"' 9 there is a much greater likelihood of uniformity
and consistency.
Greenberg's abandonment of the prior distinction between the acquisi-
tion of a specialty and the improvement or maintainance of skills pointed
to the necessity of change in this area. Prior cases seemed to be at odds with
each other, some emphasizing the primary purpose test,20 and others seem-
ingly ignoring it,21 but always trying to maintain the distinction between the
improvement of skills and the acquisition of a specialty. Greenberg's fusion
of these two categories pointed to the need for a new method of deciding
upon the deductibility of educational expenses, a need which seems to have
been met by the October 1 proposals.
CRIINAL LAW-JOINT TRIALS-CNFRONTATION IssuE-United States
v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206 (2d. Cir. 1966)-In United States v. Bozza,' the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the convictions of those defendants
whom the court found to have been prejudiced by the introduction of co-de-
17 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a), provides: "In general-There shall be allowed
as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the tax-
able year in carrying on any trade or business...
18 45 T.C. at 484.
19 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 297 (1960), as quoted by Judge
Dawson, 45 T.C. at 486.
20 Carlucci and Watson, supra notes 8 and 9.
21 Namrow and Gilmore, supra notes 3 and 4.
1 365 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1966).
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fendant Jones' confession. 2 The trial judge had denied the co-defendants'
motion for severance and had admitted the confession after deleting the names
of the other defendants and after giving clear, timely instructions limiting the
jurors' use of the confession to the confessing defendant alone. In holding
for reversal, the court of appeals read Delli Paoli v. United States3 as re-
moving the initial barrier to appellate review by rejecting clear, timely instruc-
tions as a conclusive judicial cure for prejudicial spill-over resulting from
the admission of evidence which is competent against some but not all
defendants. The question arises whether the Bozza court's decision was per-
missible in light of Supreme Court decisions that have considered the prob-
lem of joint trials and cautionary instructions directly and whether in post-
Delli Paoli decisions in analogous situations the court has not raised the
question of prejudicial spill-over to a constitutional level. The most pertinent
constitutional issue is the protection of a co-defendant's confrontation rights.
If the reviewing court decides that cautionary instructions were ineffective
in preventing the jury from using a non-judicial confession or admission of
one defendant against co-defendants, then it must also find that the co-
defendants injured by this spill-over were denied their confrontation rights.
The reasoning is simple. Pointer v. Texas4 held that every accused shall have
the right to confront the witnesses against him, and that this right includes
the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. A defendant may not call a
co-defendant to the stand, nor comment on a co-defendant's failure to take
the stand.8 Even if the defendant who had made nonjudicial statements
voluntarily took the stand, a co-defendant would be denied cross-examina-
tion as to evidence "technically" not introduced against him. The Bozza
court in reality found a violation of the co-defendants' rights to confronta-
tion.6 In Barton v. United States,7 the court reversed the conviction of a
2 Nonjudicial declarations of a conspirator made during a conspiracy and in
furtherance of such conspiracy are admissable, provided a foundation had been laid by
independent proof for the existence of the conspiracy, as a vicarious exception to the
hearsay exclusionary rule, under the rationale that each conspirator acts as an agent to
each other conspirator. United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460, 469-70
(1827). However, after termination of the conspiracy, as here by arrest, the nonjudicial
declarations are no longer admissible against co-conspirators but may be used against
the declarant as an admission against penal interest. Krulewitch v. United States, 336
U.S. 440 (1949). See generally, Model Code of Evidence rule 508(b) (1942), Uniform
Rules of Evidence 63 (9).
3 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
4 Id. at 239.
5 In DeLuna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962), rehearing denied, 324
F.2d 375 (1963), it was held that the defendant's attorney's repeated comment on co-
defendant's failure to take the stand was reversible error, notwithstanding curative in-
structions, because of violation of co-defendants' 5th Amendment rights to remain silent.
6 United States v. Bozza, supra note 1, at 215. In his dissent, Moore recognized the
confrontation problem, but limited his discussion to the impropriety of an appellate court
invading the sacrosanct of the jury room. Id. at 227-31.
7 263 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1959). Accord, State v. Blanchard, 44 NJ. 195, 207 A.2d
681 (1965). But cf. United States v. Berman, 24 F.R.D. 26 (SJD.N.Y. 1959).
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defendant who had been implicated by an unsigned statement of a co-
defendant which was accompanied by cautionary instructions. The court
grounded its decision on the defendant's confrontation right and made no
mention of Delli Paoli. The real issue is not whether an appellate court will
find prejudicial spill-over violated an implicated co-defendant's confrontation
rights, but whether a court will allow itself to find that prejudicial spill-over
has occurred in the first case.
The Bozza court found in Delli Paoli a framework for analyzing a par-
ticular case to determine whether prejudicial spill-over has occurred. This
framework included viewing the trial proceeding in light of five factors: (1)
the simplicity of the trial proceeding, keeping in mind the number of de-
fendants and the complexity of evidential restrictions; 8 (2) the emphasis
placed on the separate interests of each defendant throughout; 9 (3) the
difficulty that the jurors would have in segregating the objectionable item of
evidence from the other evidence; 10 (4) the probable force of the possible
spill-over in establishing the government's case against the co-defendants;"
and (5) the presence of any indication in the record that the jury was con-
fused or that it had failed to follow instructions.1 2 The latter consideration
would have been grounds for reversal even before Delli Paoli,13 but the
Bozza court was no longer willing to confine inquiry to positive examples of
confusion, even though the court has found some indication of confusion in
the trial record.
8 Delli Paoli: conspiracy charge was of a simple nature and the part that each
defendant played was easily understood, not a mass trial or one with a multiplicity of
evidential restrictions. Bozza: there were three substantive conspiracy counts and seven
substantive counts that the jury had to dispose of in various numbers as to six de-
fendants. The trial lasted thirty days.
9 Delli Paoli: each defendant had separate attorneys and each attorney emphasized
his client's interest. Bozza: this seems to have been true here also.
10 Delli Paoli: confession was introduced at the end of the government's case. Bozza:
confession was introduced before testimony of an accomplice which tended to fill in the
blanks and to be interwoven in the juror's minds rather than maintain a separate in-
tegrity.
11 Deli Paoli: force of spill-over merely cumulative on government's uncontroverted
testimony implicating petitioner. Bozza: "Jones' confession furnished devastating cor-
roboration of the heavily attacked testimony of an accomplice on which the prosecution
almost entirely depended for proof of guilt, .. .probably ended whatever chance any
of them might have had to find a juror unconvinced of his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt." 365 F.2d at 216.
12 Delli Paoli: no evidence in the record of possible confusion. Bozza: the record
disclosed that the jury requested Jones' confession and they had it physically present
during their deliberations. The court felt that the jury would not have wanted this
confession in considering solely the case against Jones.
13 No cases were discovered that found that the record revealed confusion on the part
of jurors and reversed solely for that reason. However, it would seem logical that if
confusion was found in the record, reversal would be appropriate. There is much dicta
to that effect. E.g., Meredith v. United States, 238 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1958).
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In considering the problem of prejudicial spill-over, the question that
must be answered is the amount of justifiable reliance which can be placed
on the efficacy of limiting instructions in joint trials to preserve the rights of
co-defendants. Assuming reliance upon instructions would be justifiable in
one class of cases and not justifiable in another, it seems appropriate to
consider joint trials and the various problems they present to determine what
elements should be influential in deciding in which class a particular case
should fall. A defendant in a joint trial may be prejudiced in two distinct
ways. In some situations a general atmosphere of confusion arises which may
pose due process questions; in other situations positive evidence is admitted
against one defendant which implicates co-defendants and brings the con-
frontation rights of the co-defendants into question. In most cases a joint
trial is not as advantageous to the individual defendant as a separate trial
would be. The real question is whether the social interest in having joint
trials justifies the relative disadvantages to the accused. The social interest
in permitting joint trials is that they are a logical method of avoiding un-
necessary duplication in prosecuting defendants for acts arising out of the
same general fact situation and calling for basically the same evidence. The
social value is a saving of the time and energy of its public servants.14 The
savings would be greater in the federal system where criminal acts are usually
long-term, complicated activities involving many people and lacking in the
clear indicia of criminal behavior which is more often found in isolated, vio-
lent criminal acts that are the subject of most state prosecutions. Joint
trials also save expense because venue may be more advantageously set.' 5
Whatever weight these social advantages may have in balancing the state's
interest in having joint trials against a defendant's contentions that the gen-
eral atmosphere of a trial situation was unfair, it would seem that these
considerations of the social advantages would be irrelevant where the in-
fringement of a dearly defineable constitutional guarantee, more particularly,
the right of confrontation, is urged.
Some of the advantages that a joint trial provides the prosecutor are
not based on social justification but are the tolerated by-products. In the
eyes of the prosecutor the real advantage of the joint trial may result from
these undesired effects which create a more favorable atmosphere for con-
viction. Each defendant, by his efforts to shift the responsibility, may assist
the prosecutor in proving his case against the other defendants. Thus, as a
practical matter, each defendant must not only repel the government's evi-
dence but also the shadings and contradictions contained in the testimony
of his co-defendants who are attempting to cast the major responsibility on
someone else.' 6 The prosecutor may also gain the advantage of prejudicial
spill-over of the evidence where limiting instructions are ineffectual. These
14 United States v. Maine Lobsterman's Ass'n, 160 F. Supp. 115, 120 (D. Me. 1957).
15 Brown v. Elliot, 225 U.S. 392 (1912). See Levi, "Hearsay and Conspiracy," 52
Mich. L. Rev. 1159 (1948).
16 DeLuna v. United States, supra note S.
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advantages are most apt to accrue in joint prosecutions for conspiracy be-
cause conspiracy implies involvement of more than one actor; to prove the
case against one defendant the prosecutor must be allowed to introduce
evidence implicating others.17 In theory, the prosecutor has an equal amount
of evidence whether the defendants are joined or separately tried; in fact,
however, the prosecutor has decided advantages at the expense of the de-
fendants by having a joint trial.'8 On the other hand, a defendant in a joint
trial must attempt to preserve a separate and distinct identity in the minds
of the jury. If he fails to maintain a distinct identity, he may suffer a con-
viction based upon evidence which is theoretically incompetent against him.
His ability to maintain his separate identity becomes more difficult when a
general atmosphere of confusion is created and dangers of guilt by associa-
tion come into play. This general confusion may occur when defendant is
joined with others whose own interests tend to dominate the proceeding. The
number and type of co-defendants are important factors in determining
whether the jury can mentally segregate each defendant for individual de-
termination. Where seventy-five defendants are joined,19 or where five of
fourteen co-defendants have the same surname,20 it is difficult to believe, in
such a confusing atmosphere, that any individualized consideration by the
jurors is possible. Even where the number of defendants joined is reasonable,
the characteristics of a particular defendant may dominate the trial pro-
ceeding, for example, where one defendant is being tried for a much more
serious offense 2 ' or where one defendant has had adverse pre-trial publicity.
22
17 Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 623 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
"But one of the additional leverages obtained by the prosecution through proceedings as
for conspiracy instead of as for the substantive offense is that it may get into evidence
against one defendant's acts or omissions which color the case against all". In Krulewitch
v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 457 (1949), Justice Jackson, in a concurring opinion,
stated "I think there should be no straining to uphold any conspiracy conviction
where prosecution for the substantive offense is adequate and the purpose served by add-
ing the conspiracy charge seems chiefly to get procedural advantages to ease the way for
conviction."; Levi, supra note 15, at 1174 "(Post-conspiracy declarations) look impres-
sive and the fine point of restricting admissions to the party who made the declaration
is often lost on a jury." Levi noted that there are an increasing number of conspiracy
prosecutions in lieu of substantive offense because of the practical advantages gained by
the prosecutor. In the Conference of Senior Circuit judges, Annual Report of Attorney
General, 5-6 (1925), there was expressed a growing concern of the use of conspiracy
prosecutions "with the effect of bringing in much improper evidence."
18 In his dissenting opinion in Delli Paoli, Frankfurter wrote, "The Government
should not have the windfall of having the jury be influenced by evidence against a de-
fendant which, as a matter of law, they should not consider but which they cannot put
out of their minds." 352 U.S. at 248.
19 Allen v. United States, 4 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, Mullen v. United
States, 267 U.S. 598 (1925). See also "Recent Developments in the Law-Criminal Con-
spiracy," supra note 15, at 980.
20 Scarborough v. United States, 232 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1956) (reversing for tardy
instructions).
21 Arguments that co-defendant was indicted for a more serious offense rejected as
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In some cases hostility between co-defendants adds an additional element of
confusion into the proceeding.2 3 Under the recent amendment to Rule 14,24
the federal judge can consider the prosecutor's entire case when a motion
for severance is made; this motion would usually be made long before trial.
It would seem that a defendant should have a separate trial where a joint
trial would present a possibility of general confusion unless the government
bears the burden of showing that there would be a substantial savings in
time and money with minimal detriment to any defendant.
Perhaps the most dangerous situation, one which raises confrontation
problems, is where the jury cannot or will not restrict evidence of limited
admissibility to the dictates of the accompanying instructions. The prejudice
that may occur in this situation is not one of general confusion, but instead,
it involves the possibility of prejudicial spill-over of definite evidence tend-
ing to establish the criminal participation of the implicated co-defendants.
The nonjudicial admissions or confessions of co-defendants are the most
serious variety of such evidence because of the great likelihood that they
will impress the jury. The confession is allowed to come in at the trial as
an admission against the interest of the confessor.2 5 It is felt that one would
ground for severance in United States v. Sherman, 84 F. Supp. 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1947),
affirmed in part and reversed in part, 171 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1948); cf. McDonald v.
United States, 89 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1937) (co-defendant handcuffed during trial).
22 Arguments for severance based on the pre-trial publicity of a co-defendant were
rejected in United States v. Hoffa, 205 Supp. 710 (S.D. Fla.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 892
(1962). But cf. United States v. Marshall, 360 U.S. 310 (1959) where the jurors had been
exposed to inadmissible evidence from the newspaper. Each individual juror promised
the trial judge that he would disregard this information. The Supreme Court reversed.
23 Argument that hostility among co-defendants was ground for severance was re-
jected in Goodman v. United States, 273 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1960).
24 The amendment to Fed. R. Crim. P. 14 is "In ruling on a motion by a de-
fendant for severance the court may order the attorney for the government to deliver
to the court for inspection in camera any statement or confessions made by the defen-
dant which the government intends to introduce in evidence at the trial." See 8 Moore,
Federal Practice 14.04 (2) at 14-14 (2d ed. Supp. 1966), "Examination of statements or
confessions before trial is likely to increase the number of severances since the desire of
the court to "save" a trial once it has commenced is not present. e.g., Belvin v. United
States, 273 F.2d 583, 587 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 922 (1963). Pre-trial
examination will permit the court to determine, for example, whether excision of ref-
erences to the non-declarant defendant is impracticable. A determination of impractability
should weigh heavily in favor of severance. The Advisory Committees' citation of Fifth
Circuit cases requiring severance suggests that the new provision should be liberally in-
terpreted." The burden of showing prejudice has previously been on the defendants; e.g.,
Hall v. United States, 168 F.2d 161 (D.D.C.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 853 (1948); United
States v. Haim, 218 F. Supp. 922, 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); United States v. Abrams, 29
F.R.D. 178, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). It is suggested that this amendment places the burden
on the government to show that joinder would not be prejudicial. 8 Moore, supra at ff
14.02[1] at 14-3.
25 Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954). See Model Code of Evidence rule
509 (1942).
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not admit to activities which may give rise to penal sanctions unless they
were true. Thus, non-judicial confessions are felt to have a satisfactory de-
gree of trustworthiness as far as they describe the activities of the confessor.
Furthermore, the confessor is in court and can take the stand to clarify or
otherwise protect himself from the confession being improperly used. How-
ever, such guarantees of trustworthiness do not accompany statements im-
plicating others.
Declarations made after the conspiracy ends are particularly un-
trustworthy. Once the conspiracy terminates, the interest of every
member is to avoid responsibility and shift the blame. What he
says about himself by way of an admission or confession may well
be true and is, at any rate, against his own interest. But what he
says about others may be based on spite, fear, pique, malice, or
desire to stand well with the prosecutor or many other motives not
leading to truth2 6
Courts have attempted to delete statements implicating defendants from
nonjudicial admissions of co-defendants. Sometimes deletion is not possible
without rendering the item of evidence meaningless. Even where references
to non-confessing defendants can be deleted, subsequent testimony may fill
in the missing pieces. When this happens, deletion may actually have the
opposite effect. Having had their curiosity excited, the jury may be more
likely to use the evidence against those defendants whose "secret identity"
had been discovered.27 However, where the deleted references cannot be dis-
covered, directly or indirectly, the defendants are protected from possible
prejudicial spill-over. Where deletion is not possible and evidence of limited
admissibility is presented, limiting instructions must be given.
It may be valuable to distinguish limiting instructions in the multi-
defendant situation from limiting instructions in the single defendant situa-
tion. The purposes they serve in the two situations are sometimes different.
In general, limiting instructions seem to be a prerequisite of a legal system
which hopes to preserve both trial by jury and those policies that require
certain information be kept from the jury to secure a fair trial for the parties.
Because the characteristics of a proffered item of evidence may not be readily
26 Levi, supra note 15 at 1173.
27 In Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945), the Court affirmed a conviction
of a non-confessing co-defendant where an "X" was substituted for his name. In dis-
senting, Justice Rutledge wrote "The devices were so obvious as perhaps to emphasize
the identity of those they purported to conceal" 324 U.S. at 430. Compare Comments,
"post-conspiracy Admissions in Joint Prosecutions-Effectiveness of Instructions Limit-
ing the Use of Evidence to A Co-Defendant," 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 710, 713; "It seems
reasonable that a jury will follow many instructions, but it does not follow that it is
reasonable to expect a jury to obey instructions to disregard relevant evidence. Research
by the Jury Project at the University of Chicago Law School tends to support the widely
held suspicion of trial lawyers that such an instruction only serves to make the forbidden
evidence weigh more heavily in jurors' minds, even though they may consciously attempt
to follow the instructions."
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apparent, the trial judge cannot always be expected to make a proper deter-
mination in the first instance. To preserve the policies embodied in the rules
of evidence and the jury trial, the judge may have to give corrective in-
structions and, within limits, the jury must be relied on to follow his in-
structions.28 In joint trials, the judge uses limiting instructions for the
additional purpose of protecting defendants from prejudicial spill-over. Where
evidence is admissible against less than all the joined defendants, it is in-
admissible by definition against some defendants. There is little chance that
the status of such evidence will change as the trial progresses. The trial judge
must only decide whether the potential prejudice can realistically be neutral-
ized by the accompanying instructions. In deciding whether the prejudicial
spill-over can be effectively neutralized, the judge should consider the logical,
moral, and psychological difficulties that limiting instructions may raise in
the joint trial situation. Limiting instructons often require illogical thinking.
"It (the jury) cannot find that a confession is true as it admits that A
commited criminal acts with B and at the same time ignore (as the jury is
told to) the inevitable conclusion that B has committed those same criminal
acts with A."-9 Because of the logical difficulties, the use of limiting instruc-
tions to prevent spill-over may be morally questionable. Without understand-
ing the policies surrounding the use of limiting instructions, the jurors must
wonder how just is a legal system that demands of them "a violence to all
our habitual ways of thinking. . . ."3 Jurors are sincere, conscientious peo-
ple who come to serve with an expectation of a fair tribunal. If instead of
meeting their expectations, the judicial process presents them with apparently
28 "Our theory of trial relies upon the ability of a jury to follow instructions." Opper
v. United States, supra note 25, at 95. In his dissenting opinion in Bozza, Moore stressed
the need to rely on the jurors' ability to follow instructions. "The very nature of our
method of developing facts by examination of witnesses requires this assumption. All
witnesses cannot testify simultaneously. Each tells of the facts known to him-facts
which frequently are quite fragmentary . ... Thus, testimony must be accepted subject
to connection or to motion to strike if some future witness does not supply the con-
necting link. Yet the jury had heard the testimony which has reached, and made a
permanent impression on, the jury mind ..... Rarely in a trial of any duration are
there not countless incidents which require and receive such court instruction and ad-
monition. 365 F.2d at 228.
29 People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 529, 407 P.2d 267, 272, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353,
360 (1965).
30 United States v. Delli Paoli, 229 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1956) (L. Hand, I.),
aff'd 352 U.S. 232 (1957) ; People v. Aranda, supra note 29 at 526, 407 P.2d at 269, 47
Cal. Rptr. at 357. "The rule (that the jury must always be presumed to follow instruc-
tions) is not basic to our jury system. Instead, it is a rule that perverts the jury trial
since it calls upon ordinary lay people to obey an instruction that every judge realizes
cannot be obeyed. It fosters what one scholar refers to as our 'inconsistent attitudes'
toward juries. We treat them at times as a group of low-grade morons and 'at other
times as men endowed with a superhuman ability to control their emotions and intellects'
(Morgan, Some Problems of Proof under the Anglo-American System of Litigation
(1956) p. 105.)"
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unreasonable technicalities, the legal system will suffer a loss in dignity. The
jurors may rebel at the task and refuse to follow the instructions. Even where
the jurors would be willing to follow instructions, they may be psychologi-
cally unable to do so. Much judicial response has been directed at this viola-
tion of the epistemic condition of admissibility. "Exposed to the realities of
depth psychology, judicial cliches carving jurors' minds into autonomous seg-
ments may waiver and fail. '3' Judge Learned Hand called this use of limiting
instructions "the recommendation to the jury of mental gymnastic which is
beyond, not only their powers, but anybody else's."'32
In light of the discussion of the dangers of untrustworthiness that the
implicating portions of a co-defendant's non-judicial confession may present,
the weaknesses found in the use of limiting instructions to prevent the ap-
parently reliable implicating remarks from spilling over on the implicated
co-defendants, and the confrontation problems such a procedure seems to
raise, it seems important to consider how the Supreme Court has dealt
with this problem. In Delli Paoli, the Court reaffirmed its faith in the jury
system and warned against appellate courts engaging in "unfounded specula-
tion that the jurors disregarded clear instructions of the court in arriving at
their verdict. 3 3 However, the Court also stated "There may be practical
limitations to the circumstances under which a jury should be left to follow
instructions, but this case does not present them."3 4 and "Unless we proceed
on the basis that the jury will follow the court's instructions where those
instructions are clear and the circumstances are suck that a jury can reason-
ably be expected to follow them, the jury system makes little sense. '35 Thus,
the majority indicated that clear instructions cannot be relied on in all cases.
In support of its holding, the Court in Delli Paoli cited earlier federal cases,
none of which suggest that the determination is to be made on a constitu-
tional basis.36 The major supporting cases were Blumenthal v. United
States,3 7 Lutwak v. United States,38 and Opper v. United States.3 9 None of
31 People v. Chambers, 231 Cal. App. 2d 23, 33, 41 Cal. Rptr. 551, 558 (1966).
32 Nash v. United States, 43 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 285 US. 556
(1932). The court of appeals affirmed the convictions on the grounds that this area
should be left to the trial judge's discretionary powers. Hand also indicated that such
prejudicial effect may further rather than impede the search for truth. 54 F.2d at 1007.
33 Delli Paoli, supra note 3, at 242 (quoting Opper v. United States, supra note 25
at 95).
34 Id. at 243.
35 Id. at 242 (Emphasis added).
36 Cf. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800 (1952) in which the Court rejected
arguments that instructions would confuse the jury as to distinction between the state's
burden of proving premeditation and the other elements of the change and appellant's
burden of proving insanity. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 427 (1964) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
37 332 U.S. 539, rehearing denied, 332 U.S. 856 (1947), affirming the convictions of
four petitioners jointly tried with another defendant for conspiring above the ceiling set
by the regulations of the Office of Price Administration, in violation of the Emergency
Price Control Act.
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these cases contained compelling language indicating that the jury must be
presumed to follow clear instructions in all cases. In Blumenthal, the Court
stressed the danger that the jury might consciously or unconsciously transfer
the effect of the evidence to those defendants against whom the evidence is
incompetent. "It is therfore extremely important that those safeguards
(against the improper use of evidence by the jury) be made as impregnable
as possible. '40 However, the Court held that there were none of the common
risks of prejudice presented in the particular proceeding. There were only
five defendants charged with a single count in an uncomplicated proceeding.
The Court also held that the unobjectionable evidence was sufficient to sup-
port a conviction. In Lutwak, the majority held that the use of one item of
inadmissible hearsay did not call for reversal where the record "fairly shrieks
the guilt of the parties." ' 1 The dissent in Lutwak considered other evidence
that had been accompanied by limiting instructions and observed that "much
of such evidence was of such remote probative value, and the instruction
limiting its use so predictably ineffectual that its admission violated a sub-
stantial right of those defendants," 42 because no jury could perform the task
called for in the instructions. Thus, the majority in Lutwak dealt with the
issue of the jury's ability to follow instructions only by its silence. In Opper
v. United States, the Court gave little weight to the petitioner's claim of
prejudicial spill-over and indicated that the petitioner had raised only a
"general possibility of confusion" but pointed out nothing specifically preju-
dicial resulting from the joint trial."4 3 The Court also found substantial
competent evidence upon which the jury could have found the petitioner
guilty. Each of these three cases looked to the competent evidence against
the petitioner. If the competent evidence would have been adequate to
find the petitioner guilty, the prejudice was harmless. The Bozza court, how-
ever, adopted a different standard of plain error, "The test is whether belief
'is sure that the error did not influence the jury or had but very slight effect'
-even if that be the standard in area with 'grave constitutional overtones.' ,44
Despite these prior decisions in point, other Supreme Court decisions
38 344 U.S. 604 (1953), affirming the convictions of three jointly tried defendants
for conspiracy to defraud the United States by obtaining illegal entry of three aliens
under the War Brides Act by means of sham marriages.
30 348 U.S. 84 (1954), affirming the conviction of a federal employee charged with
violating 18 U.S.C. § 281 by agreeing to receive compensation from a co-defendant.
40 Blumenthal v. United States, supra note 37, at 559-60.
4 1 Lutwak v. United States, supra note 38, at 619.
42 Id. at 623.
43 Opper v. United States, supra note 39 at 94.
44 United States v. Bozza, supra note 1, at 218. "To be sure the evidence apart from
Jones' confession was ample for conviction on all counts if the jury believed Kuhle, as
we have relatively little doubt it would have even without the impressive corroboration
which the confession furnished. However, it is not that 'the jury would have in all
probability returned a verdict of guilty' against the other defendants without knowledge
of Jones' confession, which they were forbidden to possess." Ibid.; See also Fed. R. Crim.
P. 52.
1967]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
following Delli Paoli may have raised the question of prejudicial spill-over
to one of constitutional dimensions. In Jackson v. Denno,45 the court held
that it was a violation of due process to require the convicting jury to de-
termine both the voluntariness and weight to be given a confession. The
Court felt that the jury could not be trusted to disregard an involuntary
confession which it also found to be truthful. The Court asked rhetorically:
If (the jury) finds the confession involuntary, does the jury-
indeed, can it-then disregard the confession in accordance with its
instructions? If there are lingering doubts about the sufficiency of
other evidence, does the jury unconsciously lay them to rest by re-
sorting to the confession? Will uncertainty about the sufficiency of
the other evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt ac-
tually result in acquittal when a jury knows the defendant has
given a truthful confession? 46
The Court held that the jury could not. Similar questions arise in the Bozza
situation. Can a jury be expected to use a co-defendant's truthful confession
or admission to convict him and then disregard the same confession in con-
sidering the guilt or innocense of the co-defendants whom the confession has
implicated? Perhaps the Bozza situation presents an even stronger case for
striking down a trial procedure than the procedure considered in Jackson.
In comparing the two situations, Chief Justice Traynor wrote:
Under the New York procedure, which Jackson held violated
due process, the jury was only required to disregard a confession it
found to be involuntary. If it made such a finding, then the confes-
sion was presumably out of the case. In joint trials, however, when
the admissible confession of one defendant inculpates another de-
fendant, the confession is never deleted from the case and the jury
is expected to perform the overwhelming task of considering it in
determining the guilt or innocence of the declarant and then of ig-
noring it in determining the guilt or innocence of any co-defendant
of the declarant.47
However, the Bozza court avoided the question, "Without going so far as to
say that the logic of Jackson v. Deuno ... necessarily removes any basis for
relying on an instruction to limit the damaging effects of a confession im-
plicating a co-defendant. . .. ,,48 Nevertheless, in comparing Jackson and
Delli Paoli, Justice Harlan in a dissenting opinion in Jackson observed:
45 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
48 Id. at 388.
47 People v. Aranda, supra note 29, at 529, 407 P.2d at 271-72, 47 Cal. Reptr. at
359-60. Although Traynor bad "grave constitutional doubts of permitting joint trials
where the confession of one defendant implicates co-defendants," the opinion did not
decide on a constitutional basis. "Whether or not it is constitutionally permissible, the
practice if prejudicial and unfair to the nondeclarant defendant and must be altered." Id.
at 530, 407 P.2d at 272, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
48 United States v. Bozza, supra note 1, at 217.
[Vol. 28
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
But was there not greater danger in Delli Paoli that one defendant's
confession of his and his codefendants' guilt would infect the jury's
deliberation bearing on the guilt of the codefendants? And was it
not more 'difficult, if not impossible' for jurors to lodge the evidence
in the right mental compartments in a trial of five defendants than
here, in a trial of one.4 9
The recent case of Spencer v. Texas ° seems to give weight to the proposition
that the similarities of the problem in Jackson and Delli Paoli may fore-
shadow a holding that the Delli Paoli procedure violates due process." The
problem in both cases is the scope of reliance that can be placed on the
jury's ability to comply with the legal safeguards provided by instructions
where a specific constitutional right may be substantially threatened if this
judicial cure fails. Whether or not this judicial cure has failed remains hid-
den behind the general verdict. In Spencer, the petitioners relied solely on a
Jackson-type argument to attack a procedure that permitted the jury to con-
sider evidence of prior convictions during the guilt-determining stage of the
trial. The evidence of prior crimes did not fall within any of the historic
exceptions to the exclusionary rule for hearsay and was introduced solely for
the purpose of determining whether there had been prior convictions. This
determination would affect the selection of penal sanctions under habitual
offender statutes. The Court rejected this Jackson-type argument and held
that it would be a wholly unjustified encroachment by the Court to promul-
gate rules of evidence for the state so long as their rules are not prohibited
by any specific provision of the Constitution.52 Thus the Court announced
that a Jackson approach to cautionary instructions, an approach that would
not permit a jury to be guardian of a constitution1 right where the tempta-
tion to disregard their duty is present, would only be appropriate where the
protection of a clearly defineable constitutional right is needed.
[T]he emphasis there (in Jackson) was on protection of a specific
constitutional right, and the Jackson procedure was designed as a
specific remedy to ensure that an involuntary confession was not in
fact relied upon by the jury. In the procedure before us, in contrast,
no specific federal right-such as that dealing with confessions-is
involved; reliance is placed solely on a general "fairness" approach.
In this area the Court has always moved with caution before strik-
ing down state procedures. 53
Such protection of a specific constitutional right is also needed where the
confession or admission of one defendant may directly implicate co-defen-
49 Jackson v. Denno, supra note 45, at 434-35. (Dissenting opinion.)
Go 87 Sup. Ct. 648 (1967).
51 "The Supreme Court, 1963 Term," 78 Harv. L. Rev. 143, 213 n.25 (1964) finding
significance in the fact the Court in Jackson quoted from Frankfurter's dissent in Delli
Paoli.
52 Spencer v. Texas, supra note 50 at 656.
53 Id. at 654.
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dants. The only protection provided for the implicated co-defendant's spe-
cific guarantee of confrontation is the jury's obedience to cautionary instruc-
tions. The temptation to flaunt the instructions or unconsciously disregard
them is present. Thus it would seem a Jackson-type analysis is appropriate
to prohibit trial procedures that permits such implicating evidence to be
admitted. In other joint trial situations, where the prejudice results from a
general atmosphere of confusion rather than the admission of any positive
implicating evidence, no specific constitutional guarantee will be threatened,
but only the more nebulous notions of due process fairness. In these situa-
tions a Jackson approach seemingly will not be employed by the Court. The
reviewing courts can probably continue to rely on the trial judge's discretion
in permitting joint trials where the possibility of prejudice of this general
nature might occur.
If the Supreme Court does find that the introduction of evidence of
limited admissibility in joint trials which might have a spill-over effect vio-
lates the Constitution, prosecutors who hope to conduct joint trials will be
required to keep out non-judicial declarations of one defendant that impli-
cate co-defendants. If the inferences contained in such declarations can be
completely removed, there will be no need for cautionary instructions and
no threat to co-defendants' confrontation rights. The prosecutor may intro-
duce the declarations safely. However, if the implicating effect cannot be
removed, a prosecutor must either refrain from using such evidence or try
the confessing defendant separately. The practical effect would be to allow
joint trials, but only where the defendants are accorded some of the safe-
guards they would have had had they been separately tried. In light of the
recent amendment to Rule 14, there would seem to be no great burden on
the trial judge in the federal system to comply with this possible constitu-
tional standard at the pre-trial stage; the issue may arise at a latter stage
of the proceedings in state courts when the prosecutor seeks to introduce
the objectionable evidence because of the absence of effective pre-trial dis-
covery procedures for defendants. The continuation of the co-conspirators
exception to the hearsay exclusionary rules may also be subject to attack. If
the Court does not establish a conclusive presumption of a confrontation
violation where there is implicating evidence accompanied by cautionary
instructions, but instead sanctions a Bozza-type approach in which various
elements in the trial setting are scrutinized to determine whether prejudicial
spill-over has occurred, there will still be important advantages to the co-
defendants who argue that a violation of their confrontation rights took
place. They would have a new basis for federal jurisdiction5 4 and would have
the question of prejudicial spill-over considered without looking to the suffi-
ciency of other evidence to render "harmless" a violation of a defendant's
confrontation rights.
55
54 Comment, 13 U.CL.A.L. Rev. 366, 379 (1965).
55 Jackson v. Denno, supra note 45 at 383, "The danger that matters pertaining to
defendant's guilt will infect the jury's findings of fact bearing upon voluntariness, is
sufficiently serious to preclude their unquestioned acceptance regardless of whether there
is or is not sufficient other evidence to sustain a finding of guilt."
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREE ExERCisE OF RELIGIoN-DENIED As A
DEFENSE To NARCOTICS CHARGE-State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d
565 (1966)-In 1966, in State v. Bullard,' the North Carolina Supreme Court
sustained a conviction for unlawful possession of narcotics. Defendant argued
that peyote and marijuana were not narcotics, and their possession was lawful.
The court denied this defense because the statutory definition of narcotics
included peyote and marijuana, and expert testimony characterized the two
drugs as narcotics.2 Regarding the defendant's major defense that he was
a Peyotist to whom the use of the drugs was necessary in the practice of
his religion, the court held that, even if the defendant was sincere in his
religious belief, the first amendment could not protect him. While the amend-
ment permitted him complete freedom of religion in that he could belong to
any church or to no church and could believe whatever he wanted, however
fantastic, illogical or unreasonable, it did not authorize him in the exercise of
his religion to commit acts which constituted threats to the public safety,
morals, peace and order.3 Defendant's constitutional rights were not violated
when he was forbidden, despite his religion, possession of drugs which produce
hallucinatory symptoms.4
Obviously, the basis for any defense on religious grounds must be found
in the first amendment. Yet the simple words, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof," do not say much without judicial interpretation. It is generally
recognized that the framers of the Constitution were greatly influenced by
the natural rights theory,0 which viewed the individual as possessing certain
indefeasible primary rights which should be protected against governmental
intrusion or group encroachment. Religious freedom was considered to be
one such right. However, a "right" may have many explanations, ranging
from immunity, characterized by complete absence of government restric-
tions, to privileges, which the government may or may not allow.7 The
prevailing concept has been that the first amendment neither takes away
nor abridges any power of the government, but makes express the absence
of power.8 Yet this immunity principle cannot be literally applied because
a government must be able to restrict some types of religious activities to
preserve a society where freedom of religion can exist.9
A practical solution to the immunity dilemma was presented by the
Supreme Court in Reynolds v. United States,'0 in which a federal antibigamy
1 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966).
2 Id. at 601, 148 S.E.2d at 567.
3 Id. at 603-04, 148 S.E.2d at 568-69.
4 Id. at 604, 148 S.E.2d at 569.
G U.S. Const. amend. I.
6 Pfeffer, Church, State and Freedom 91 (1953).
7 Pollack, "Natural Rights: Conflict and Consequence," 27 Ohio St. LJ. 59, 560
(1966).
8 Pfeffer, supra note S at 115.
9 Pollack, supra note 6 at 561-62.
10 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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statute was upheld.1 To defendant's claim of exception from the statute
because the religious tenets of the Mormon church required the practice
of polygamy, the Court answered that the first amendment did not protect
such religious practices:
Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion,
but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social
duties or subversive to good order. . . . Laws are made for the
government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere
religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.12
Originally the first amendment was held not applicable to the states."
However, state courts followed Reynolds in cases which involved religious
defenses under state constitutions, and decided such cases on the basis of
the distinction between religious belief or opinion and action.14 Where a state
enforced a regulation, the purpose of which in the general community
estimation was non-religious, exemption on religious grounds was denied.'"
The first amendment was first held applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut,'6 which case expanded
the Reynolds test to include balancing state regulatory interests against
religious interests:
The Amendment embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and
freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the
second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the
protection of society. The freedom to act must have appropriate
definition to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every
case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining
a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.
17
11 The Court found that polygamy had always been odious to our culture and an
offense against society punishable by the civil courts, and considered polygamy as a
threat to democratic institutions. Id. at 166-67.
12 98 U.S. at 164, 166.
13 Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845), which held that an in-
fringement of religious liberty by a state was a matter for the state itself under the
state constitution or laws.
14 E.g., Delk v. Commonwealth, 166 Ky. 39, 178 S.W. 1129 (1915); McMasters v.
State, 21 Okla Crim. 3, 8, 207 Pac. 566 (1922); State v. Marble, 72 Ohio St. 21, 73
N.E. 1063 (1905).
'5 E.g., Dunham v. Board of Education, 154 Ohio St. 469, 96 N.E.2d 413 (1951),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 915 (1951); State v. Powell, 58 Ohio St. 324, 50 N.E. 900 (1898).
16 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
17 Id. at 303, 304. Subsequent cases do not show any clear guidelines but only the
results of case by case adjudication. Religious claims were denied because a municipality
bad authority to impose regulations to assure the safety and convenience of the
people in the use of public highways. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
The state's interest in the health and welfare of a child was found to be superior to the
parents' and child's religious scruples. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
Cursing a public officer was not an exercise of religion. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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Further guidelines were set out in Sherbert v. Verner,18 which reversed
a state court's determination that a Seventh-day Adventist, whose religion
prohibited Saturday work, was ineligible for unemployment benefits because
of her unavailability for employment. The Supreme Court held that denial
of benefits was the same type of a burden on the free exercise of religious
observance as a fine imposed for Saturday worship.19 It further held that a
state cannot, unless justified by a compelling state interest in the regulation
of a subject, condition public benefits, whatever their purpose, so as to
inhibit or deter first amendment freedoms. Merely showing a rational rela-
tionship to some colorable state interest is insufficient; only the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limita-
tions.20 The state must demonstrate that alternative forms of regulation
would be ineffective.21 Different results may be reached only where exemption
on religious grounds would be of such magnitude as to render the entire
statutory scheme unworkable.22
In 1964, the California Supreme Court applied the Sherbert guidelines
in People v. Woody,2 holding that the state cannot constitutionally apply a
statute proscribing the use of peyote to prevent Indians from using it in their
religious ceremonies. The court specifically held that Sherbert called for a
determination of (1) whether the application of the statute24 imposes any
burden upon the free exercise of the defendants' religion, and (2) if it does,
whether some compelling state interest justifies the infringement 2 5 In Woody,
a burden was imposed because peyote was an object of worship and denial
of its use would result in a virtual inhibition of the practice of the defendants'
religion. 20 The state's claim that compelling reasons for prohibition of
Peyotism were its deleterious effects upon the Indian community and ex-
tensive problems in the enforcement of state narcotics laws caused by the
difficulty of detecting fraudulent claims of religious use of peyote was found
by the court to be unsupported by facts.27 The court distinguished Reynolds
stating (1) that polygamy, a basic tenet in the theology of Mormonism, is
not essential to practice of the religion, whereas peyote is essential to
Peyotism, because without it the defendants are unable to experience or
18 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
19 Id. at 404.
20 Id. at 406.
21 Id. at 407. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), where exemption for
Sabbatarians appeared to present too many administrative problems.
22 Id. at 408. Subsequently the Court vacated a judgment against a juror convicted
for refusal to serve on jury because of her religious belief against judging others, and
remanded the case for further consideration in light of Sherbert. In re Jenison, 375
U.S. 14 (1963).
23 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
24 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11500.
25 61 Cal. 2d at 719, 394 P.2d at 816, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
26 Id. at 722, 394 P.2d at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74-75.
27 Id. at 722-23, 394 P.2d at 818-19, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
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practice their religion; and (2) that the degree of danger to state interests
in Reynolds far exceeded that in Woody.28
Thus we have Bullard and Woody, two somewhat parallel recent cases
questioning the relation between free exercise of religion under the first
amendment and enforcement of a state's drug control laws, but reaching
different results. Ostensibly, the differing results may be due to the North
Carolina Supreme Court's reliance on Reynolds, with its belief-action test,
as being the governing law, and a state's power to regulate conduct in the
interest of public welfare.29 The Bullard court may have believed that Sher-
bert applies to non-criminal cases where no compelling state interest ap-
pears.3 0 This approach tends to ignore the Supreme Court's general efforts
during the last decade to give more recognition to individual rights, especially
in the first amendment area.8 1 However, despite the North Carolina court's
sole reliance on Reynolds, further exploration will indicate that, because of
particular facts, Bullard was decided correctly under the Sherbert tests.
Early recognition was accorded the states' inherent police power, sub-
ject only to constitutional limitations, to promote the health, safety and
general welfare of their citizens.3 2 After certain drugs, formerly praised for
their pain-relieving and relaxing qualities, turned out to be habit-forming and
addicting, the government and the states began to regulate them.33 Today
most states have enacted the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act34 for the purpose
of regulating and controlling the use and traffic in substances that are ex-
tremely injurious to the normal qualities and physical structure of human
beings.3 5 In addition, other dangerous drug acts are being passed today to
regulate sedation drugs and "psychedelics." 3 6 Since strict laws have not
28 Id. at 725, 394 P.2d at 820, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
29 267 N.C. at 603, 148 S.E.2d at 569.
30 See Brief for the State, pp. 18-19.
31 See generally Konvitz, Expanding Liberties (1966).
32 See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). Pfeffer, Church, State and Freedom
572-603 (1953).
n "A narcotic is a drug which, in proper doses, relieves pain and induces profound
sleep, but which, in poisonous doses, induces stupor, coma or convulsions. Narcotics
tend to be habit-forming, and in many instances, repeated doses lead to addiction."
State of Cal., Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, The Narcotic Problem
5 (3rd ed. 1964). Addiction is a state of periodic or chronic intoxication, detrimental
to the individual and to society, produced by repeated consumption of a drug and
characterized by an overpowering desire or need to continue taking the drug and to
obtain it by any means. Schur, Narcotic Addiction in Britain and America 16 (1963).
34 E.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3719.01-.99 (Page Supp. 1966).
35 93 A.L.R.2d 1008 (1964).
86 E.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 11901-16, New York Public Health Law
§§ 3370-90. Many drugs formerly thought "safe" have later proved to be habit-forming
or, because of resulting drowsiness, difficulty in thinking and uncoordinated movements,
have lead to vehicular accidents, injury by falling, interference with occupational skills,
and violent or assaultive behavior. Essig, "Newer Sedation Drugs that Can Cause States
of Intoxication and Dependence of Barbiturate Type," 1966 A.M.A.J. 714. Certain drugs
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stopped addiction and traffic in drugs, some writers advocate more liberal
laws providing treatment instead of punishment, with no criminal penalties
for use or possession of non-addicting drugs.37 Yet no one denies that drug
control is states' concern. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the
right of the state to exercise its power in this area is so manifest in the
interest of public health as not to be questioned,38 and that the state has a
wide range of sanctions, ranging from penal remedies to compulsory treat-
ment.3 9
Is the state interest in drug control substantial and compelling enough
to win when balanced against a constitutional claim? The words "substantial"
and "compelling" have never been defined. There is no standard for
adjudicating them, no scale for measuring them. In a given case, when a
court talks about the state's having a substantial interest, it, in effect, has
already decided that the particular interest should be upheld. Occasionally,
the decision is easy, as where the purported purpose of regulation cannot be
achieved and the true reason is out of favor.40 In other cases, balancing of
interests is more difficult because both sides have a good cause. Obviously,
the deciding factor in such cases will be the value system of the individual
judge.41 This may result in the same subject matter being considered a
substantial state interest in one case and not considered as such in another 42
The Woody court apparently read Sherbert as requiring a compelling
state interest to enforce the questioned statute against the particular de-
fendants.43 If such interpretation of Sherbert is literally applied, most state
with hallucinogenic effects, such as mescaline and its salts, peyote, LSD, psilocybin, and
marijuana, have become extremely popular and are termed "psychedelic," meaning
"mind-manifesting," implying that they bring to the fore previously hidden or less
manifest aspects of the subject's mind. They have been invested with an aura of magic,
and users have described their effects in mystical terms and have sometimes claimed
religious experiences. Medical evidence shows that unsupervised, nonmedical use, especially
of LSD, can lead to delusions, suicide attempts, and prolonged psychoses, requiring long
treatment. Cole and Katz, "The Psychotomimetic Drugs," 1964 A.MA.J. 578, 760;
Ungerleider and Fuller, "The Dangers of LSD," 1966 A.MA.J. 389, 392.
37 See Lindesmith, The Addict and the Law 283-85 (1965); Alpert and Cohen,
LSD 80 (1966) (Alpert).
38 Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921).
89 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664 (1962).
40 See Heilberg v. Fixa, 236 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. Cal. 1964), affd. sub nom.
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), in which the court found that
detention of communist propaganda mail did not save costs; since the President favored
communication with all countries, there was no basis for non-delivery.
41 Wormuth and Mirken, "The Doctrine of Reasonable Alternative," 9 Utah L.
Rev. 254, 255 (1964).
42 Compare Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (state's
interest in regulating the legal profession considered), with National Ass'n for Advance-
ment of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
43 But cf. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), which did not consider whether the
particular defendant's trip to Cuba would interfere with national security.
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regulations may fail, because the state may not be able to prove that exemp-
tion of the particular defendant will invariably produce the harm guarded
against. The effect of exempting one person, or one identifiable religious
group from the enforcement of a narcotics act may be negligible, yet the
exemption of all those claiming use of a drug as part of their religious
practices may make the state law unenforcible. Yet, if the court exempts
in one case, it may feel bound to do so in another.44
Even if compelling state interest must be shown against a particular
exemption, Woody and Bullard may still be distinguishable. Woody was de-
cided on the basis of a particular fact situation. The court found only that
the state had no substantial interest in preventing members of the Native
American Church from using peyote during their religious ceremonies. Evi-
dence had shown that peyote was used only by adult Indian males during
their church ceremony which lasted from sundown to sunset. No other
drugs were used, and no physical effects had been observed. 45 Since most
of these facts were not presented in Bullard, the North Carolina court
could easily have found that a compelling state interest existed against
Bullard's religious immunity claim.46
Any adjudication regarding a claimed infringement of an individual's
first amendment rights, unless the court has already found a compelling
state interest in general application of the particular regulation, must involve
a factual determination of the individual's sincerity of belief. It is not
enough for the defendant to claim exemption on religious grounds because
he is a member of a religious group which has certain beliefs requiring par-
ticular practices or abstentions. He must convince the trier of fact that he
himself is sincere in his beliefs. Proof of faithful following of his church's
mandates over a period of time may be convincing. On the other hand,
44 See In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964), where
the court stated that its decision in Woody required it to grant a writ of habeas corpus
to Grady to consider whether he had possessed peyote for religious purposes.
45 61 Cal. 2d at 720-22, 394 P.2d at 816-18, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 72-73. See also Con-
stitutional Rights of the American Indian, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Con-
stitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 162-85
(1965).
46 Most reports have dealt only with the use of peyote by Indians. Since peyote
produces hallucinations, distortions of color and space perception, the drug's effects
may easily result in harm to the user who is engaged in some type of activity. Also, the
state has a stronger interest in controlling marijuana, which is used more widely,
produces effects similar to alcohol, may create psychological dependence and is sold
by narcotics peddlers. See Murray, "Psychology and the Drug Addict," 12 Catholic Law.
98, 108-09 (1966); State of Cal., Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement,
The Narcotic Problem 11, 12 (3rd ed. 1963); The UN World Economic & Social Council
recommended that all nations destroy the cannabis (marijuana) plant and discontinue
its use even in medical preparations. U.N. EcoSoc Council, Comm'n on Narcotic Drugs,
Summary of Ann. Rep. of Gov'ts Relating to Opium and Other Narcotic Drugs 18
(1963).
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where the defendant, as in Bullard, only joined his church recently,47 and
possibly after being questioned for the particular activity,48 the trier of
fact could easily find the defendant insincere. Alternatively, the trier might
believe the defendant regarding peyote but disbelieve that his Neo-American
Church, a peyotist religion, required the use of marijuana, a drug seldom
used for religious purposes. At the same time, the trier may be influenced
by his own religious and moral values and find sincerity where he believes
the defendant's activities are laudable but fail to do so where they appear
undesirable. In Woody, it was stipulated that the defendants had possession
of peyote as part of their religious ceremonies.49 Therefore, the defendants'
sincerity was not an issue, as it was in Bullard.
Another determination which must be made in balancing state interest
against a claim of religious exemption is whether a questioned regulation
unduly burdens religious practices. In Sherbert, the Supreme Court found
an undue burden; however, it failed to discuss what would be the minimum
burden which would create religious exemption from a statute. The Court
merely found that defendant's free exercise of religion was substantially
infringed because she was forced to choose between following the precept
of her religion and forfeiting benefits.8 0 The finding was possibly based on
a comparison with other religions, i.e., if Sunday worship is important to an
orthodox Christian, Saturday worship must be just as important to a
Seventh-day Adventist. This process has been used before, as where the
Court observed that to Jehovah's Witnesses door-to-door solicitations were
just as important as a minister's sermon from the pulpit in an orthodox
church. 1 Similarly the court in Woody first compared peyote to sacramental
wine and bread, then went on to decide that for the Indians peyote was more
than sacramental, it was so essential that without it they could not exercise
their religion at all.52 The California court had an easy case because the
role of peyote in the Native American Church is sufficiently well known
for a court to take judicial notice of its essentiality.53 However, how can the
question of essentiality be decided in other cases, where the practices are
less known?
In United States v. Ballard,5" the Supreme Court ruled that the verity
or truth of religious doctrines or beliefs, regardless of how incredible or even
preposterous, cannot be inquired into; that the only permissible inquiry
relates to the claimant's honesty and good faith. This probably means that
a defendant's characterization of certain religious practices as essential must
be accepted. Since Bullard did not state that peyote and marijuana were
47 267 N.C. at 602, 148 S.E.2d at 568.
48 See Brief for the State, p. 17.
49 61 Cal. 2d at 717, 394 P.2d at 815, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
50 374 U.S. at 404.
51 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
52 61 Cal. 2d at 721, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
53 See supra note 45.
54 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
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essential, must his religious claim be disregarded? Seemingly not, for the
Supreme Court has never stated that a practice must be essential.55 From
the cases, it is impossible to tell when certain religious practices should or
should not be accommodated. 56 Also, even if a court would like to see some
practices accommodated, if they are uncommon and have no analogy in the
jurors' own religion, the jury may frustrate the court's attempt by finding
the defendant insincere in his beliefs.
Relevant also to the question of religious freedom is the issue of whether
one may claim a constitutional exemption from state regulation grounded on
personal, as distinct from institutional religion. Inasmuch as Bullard had
joined his church only recently, a fact which might influence the jury against
finding that he was following the dictates of his church, could he have fared
better by claiming that the drugs were necessary for the practices of his
personal religion? Obviously a personal religion may be more meaningful,
more intense than an institutional religion because the individual does not
follow rituals set by others but searches for original experiences.5 7 The first
amendment is read today as securing all forms of religious expression,
creedal, sectarian or nonsectarian, wherever and however taking place,58 but,
it must be established first that a religion is involved. The Supreme Court
has expanded the concept of religion to include nontheistic religions such
as Ethical Culture and Secular Humanism. A belief in a Supreme Being is
no longer necessary, and may be replaced by a sincere and meaningful
belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that
filled by God in the life of others.6 0 Some courts have read this broadly and
found religion even where they could not tell what it was.61 However, a
definition of religion would not, in itself, solve the problem, for sincerity
of religious belief must still be established. Seemingly, sincerity of belief in
personally acquired precepts would be more difficult to prove than belief in
precepts recognized by some group, however small, because extrinsic
standards of behavior would not exist as a basis for judging one's sincerity.
In conclusion, the foregoing indicates that even if Bullard had been
reversed to consider whether or not any burden was placed on the defendant's
5 Apparently the California court was simply trying to find some rationale for
distinguishing Reynolds. It did not succeed, because, if a Mormon is condemned to
eternal damnation for not practicing polygamy (98 U.S. at 161), how can polygamy
be non-essential?
56 Kurland characterizes the current events in the religious area as "accommodation,"
without any guidelines as to how much tolerance there should be. Kurland, "Foreword
-Church and State in the United States: A New Era of Good Feelings," 1966 Wis. L.
Rev. 215.
57 James, The Varieties of Religious Experience 24-41 (First Collier Books ed.
1961).
58 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
59 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
60 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965).
61 See United States v. Stolberg, 346 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1965).
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free exercise of religion and whether any compelling state interest out-
weighed such infringement of first amendment rights, the final outcome
might still have been the same. The Minnesota Supreme Court has well
summarized some of the problems in this area:
What constitutes "religion," and whether the free exercise of
conscience is also entitled to protection, are questions yet to be
decided by the United States Supreme Court. Nor are we able to
suggest future guidelines for ascertaining in particular cases whether
or not the First Amendment is being invoked with sincerity.62
62 In re jenison, 267 Minn. 136, 137, 125 N.W.2d 588, 589 (1963).

